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ABSTRACT
An Assessment of Dual Audit Effect and Contagious Effect on the Audit Quality of

Non-Big N CPA Firms for Chinese Companies in Different Markets
by
WANGMeixin
Master of Philosophy

External auditor is an independent agent to provide assurance about the validity of
financial statements prepared by management to enhance the reliability of
information in financial reports. As such, audit quality has long been a concern for
all stakeholders and is a topic of on-going research interest. In China, the dual audit
requirement for AB share companies and AH share companies started in 2001 was
abolished in 2007 and 2010 respectively. This study attempts to examine whether
there are dual audit effect and contagious effect on the audit quality of non-Big N
audit firms for A share companies in different markets. I focus on non-Big N audit
firms since the audit quality of these firms are of greater concern. Using data from
2001 to 2012, I compare the audit quality of A share companies that also have B (or
H) shares ((AB/H) with the audit quality of pure A share companies to test whether
there is a dual audit effect on the audit quality of A-share financial statements. I also
compare AB/H share companies which hire only non-Big N auditors with those
ABIH share companies who hire non-Big N domestic auditors and Big N

international auditors to test the existence of contagious effect on the audit quality of
A-share companies. My findings indicate that dual audit does improve the audit
quality of non-Big N audit firms for A share companies. However, there was mixed
evidences on the contagious effect using different measures of audit quality. This
study contributes to the literature on enhancing our understanding of the
determinants of audit quality in China. It can also provide policy makers in emerging
economies some useful evidence on ways to improve audit quality.
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An Assessment of Dual Audit Effect and Contagious Effect on the Audit Quality
of Non-Big N CPA Firms for Chinese Companies in Different Markets

Chapter 1 Introduction

Financial statements are used to provide users including shareholders, creditors, and
regulatory bodies with information regarding the business operation and financial
position of companies. However, users of financial statements may have doubts
about the integrity and objectivity of management who prepare the financial
statements. External auditors, as an independent agent to provide assurance about
the quality of financial statements, can help enhance the credibility of information in
financial statements and consequently mitigate information risk. Considering the
importance of independent audits, non-Big N audit quality has long been a concern
for all stakeholders, especially the audit quality for listed firms because of its impact
on investors and society. As such, audit quality is a topic of on-going research
interest. Audit quality is defined as the probability that an auditor will both discover
and report a breach in the client's accounting system (DeAngelo, 1981).
This study is also motivated by the emphasis of audit quality improvement in China
in recent years. China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is now attempting
to adjust the structure imbalance in the Chinese capital market. In China, many
companies still heavily rely on indirect· financing from financial institutions like
banks instead of direct capital raising from investors in the capital market.

According to Guo (2012), the Chairman of CSRC, the capital raised through
security market consists of only 20% of the capital raised by Chinese companies.
Due to the high reliance on debt capital from commercial banks, small and medium
sized companies often encounter difficulties in financing, because banks often
hesitate to make loans to small and medium-sized companies due to their limited
ability to maintain a sound accounting system and relatively high loan risk.
Consequently, many of these firms seek to list in foreign markets to obtain capital.
For example, in 2010, among the 123 companies producing solar cells, 16 of them
chose to be listed in foreign market to raise capital (Xu eta!., 2012). To attract some
of these small and medium-sized companies back to the Chinese market and adjust
the structure imbalance in Chinese capital market, CSRC attempts to stimulate the
investment enthusiasm in the Chinese capital market (Guo, 2012). One of its
strategies is to build investor's confidence in the Chinese capital market by
providing better investor protection and improvement in the quality of information
disclosure. Audit quality could play a very important role in enhancing the quality of
information disclosure. Interestingly, in 2012, Premier Wen emphasized the
importance of audit quality as he asked auditing bodies to reveal in a timely manner
and resolve effectively various underlying financial risks in the economy (People's
daily online, 20 12). Quality audits can reduce those risks. Because of the
significance of audit quality in the Chinese market, it is important to examine the
factors that could affect auditor's audit quality.
2

Additionally, in May 2014, the Ministry of Finance in China issued the Provisional
Regulations on Cross-border Audit Services of CPA Firms (consultative draft). 1 The
proposal precludes non-PRC CPA firms from providing audit services to Chinese
companies listed overseas and enterprises registered overseas but with operating
entities in China. My research can provide insights into the influence of such
restrictions of non-PRC CPA firms audit services to Chinese companies on the audit
quality of the Chinese market.
This study attempts to examine the influence of the dual audit effect on the audit
quality of non-Big N audit firms for A shares companies and the contagious effect of
having Big N international auditors on domestic auditors' work. In contrast to prior
studies which focus on the audit quality of Big N auditors, I focus on the audit
quality of non-Big N audit firms because the audit quality of these firms is of greater
concern. In this thesis, the Big N refers to the largest international accounting firms
in China during my sample period (2001-2012), including PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
KPMG, Ernst & Young, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Arthur Anderson and.BDO.
According to the most updated ranking of CPA firms in China issued by CICPA,
1

The proposed regulations apply to the audits of Chinese enterprises listed overseas and enterprises
registered overseas but with operating entities in China, including both !PO audit and regular audit.
Non-PRC CPA firms which audit the financial statements of Chinese Enterprises listed overseas and
enterprises registered overseas but with operating entities in China according to the regulations in the
overseas listing location must cooperate with PRC CPA firms qualified for performing listedcompany audits in China or CPA firms listed in the Information of the First 100 CPA Firms in the
Comprehensive Assessment issued by CICPA last year. The non-PRC CPA firms are responsible for
issuing audit report and will bear the audit responsibility. The audit reports issued by the non-PRC
CPAs have no legal effect in China. Additionally, non-PRC CPA firms are prohibited from carrying
out audits for enterprises registered overseas but with operating entities in China through provisional

license arrangements.

3

BDO ranked No. 5 in the comprehensive assessment while KPMG ranked No. 6.
BDO consistently ranked high in recent years and is comparable in operating
income to Big 4 in China. 2 In addition, BDO entered Chinese market early in 1997
and gained reputation in providing high quality services comparable to Big 4. Thus,
it is reasonable to include BDO in Big N for the tests of dual audit effect and
contagious effect. Big N auditors have global reputation in hiring talented
employees with good communication and professional competence. Big N CPA
firms provide their people with high-level standardized training and apply
standardized audit methodologies worldwide. They are usually perceived to be
associated with higher audit quality compared with non-Big N auditors. The dual
audit for A -share firms that also have B (or H) shares listed provides a unique
opportunity for me to test the dual audit effect by comparing the audit quality of Ashare financial statements for firms with A share only with AB/H share firms. The
unique dual audit policy (one auditor for A share and one for B (or H) share
financial statements) also makes it possible to test the contagious effect of large
auditors by comparing the audit quality of A share financial statements for AB/H
share firms which hire to those which do not hire a Big N international auditor, since
both the domestic and international auditors provide audit service to the same client
2

In 2012, the ranking of CPA firms by the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA)
is: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (!), KPMG (6), Ernst & Young (4), Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2) and
BDO (5) (CICPA, 2013). RSM China certified public accountants ranked No. 3 in 2012, but RSM
entered China market late and did not cover the whole sample period. The ranking is a
comprehensive one primarily based on annual revenue along with other factors like the number of
CPAs and any discipline or punishment received during the year.
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at the same time. My setting eliminates many confounding factors associated with
cross-sectional and time series analyses because I only compare the audit quality of
A-share auditors under the same institutional environment.
My sample consists of Main-Board listed A-share firms on the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2012. I divide these firms into three groups
for my tests. The first group includes firms that issue only A shares and hire non-Big
N domestic auditors. My second group includes firms that issue both A shares and B
(or H) shares (AB/H share firms) and hire a non-Big N a domestic auditor and a
non-Big N international auditor. AB/H share firms having a non-Big N domestic
auditor and a Big N auditor form the third group. I examine the dual audit effect by
comparing the audit quality of A-share financial statements for firms in the first and
second groups, i.e. pure A share firms hiring non-Big N domestic auditors and AB/H
share firms with non-Big N domestic and non-Big N international auditors. The
contagious effect is tested by a comparison of audit quality of A share financial
statements between the second and third groups i.e. AB/H share firms with non-Big
N domestic and international auditors and AB/H share firms with a non-Big N
domestic auditor and a Big N international auditor.
I use the auditors' propensity to issue modified audit opinion and earning response
coefficient as proxies for audit quality. I find consistent evidence that dual audit
improves audit quality using bpth measurements. Mixed evidence was found
regarding contagious effect of Big N international auditor on non-Big N domestic
5

auditor's audit quality. No significant impact of hiring Big N international auditors
is found on the non-Big N domestic auditor's propensity to modifY audit opinion.
However, my empirical tests reveal a positive and significant association between
hiring a Big N international auditor and investors' responsiveness to earnings
changes (i.e. earnings response coefficient) in the A share financial statements
audited by a non-Big N domestic auditor.
The findings on the dual audit effect and contagious effect for non-Big N audit
quality of Chinese companies in different markets contribute to the literature in
enhancing our understanding about the determinants of audit quality for listed
companies in Chinese market. This study also provides evidence on the existence of
Big N auditors' contagious effect on the non-Big N auditors regarding audit quality
when they work closely. It also provides policy makers some hard evidence on ways
to improve audit quality in China and as a result enhance the institutional
enviromnent in the Chinese capital market.
I discuss the related institutional background in the next chapter. In the third chapter,
I review some prior related research studies. I develop my hypotheses in chapter 4.
Chapter 5 shows my research design, in which I discuss my test models in detail.
The empirical results of the main tests as well as sensitivity tests are reported in the
sixth chapter. The final chapter concludes my findings.
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Chapter 2 Institutional Background

This thesis studies Chinese companies in three different markets, namely, AB share
companies, AH share companies and pure A share companies. The nature of the
audit for these companies as it relates to this research is explained below.
2.1 AB share companies
AB share companies issue two sets of shares, A shares and B shares. A shares are
offered to domestic investors in China while B shares are offered to foreign
investors. 3 AB share companies are not subject to cross listing. Both shares are listed
in China's securities market. In 1992, there was a total of 18 firms with B shares. B
share market has experienced rapid development since then. In 2012, there are 107
B-share companies, among which 85 companies issue both A shares and B shares. B
share market is established primarily to provide Chinese companies with an
alternative international financial channel. Chinese companies could raise capital
from foreign investors without cross listing in foreign markets. So B shares are also
called domestically listed foreign shares. Therefore, it is necessary for these
companies to provide their company information to foreign investors. In September
1992, the Ministry of Finance and State Commission for Restrncturingjointly issued
the Provisional Regulation for CPAs in Providing Services for Pilot Joint-Stock
Enterprises which guides the audit of companies with B shares and companies listed

3

In Feb 19, 2001, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and CSRC jointly issued the
Notice on Issues Related to Individual Domestic Residents' Investment in Domestically Listed Foreign
Shares. B share market started to be open to Chinese residents from 200 I.
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m foreign markets. The regulations reqmre that the financial statements of
companies · with B shares have to be audited by Chinese Certified Public
Accountants (CPAs) and Chinese CPAs have to issue an audit report in accordance
with Chinese GAAP. In addition, to communicate information to foreign investors
or upon the requirements of overseas regulatory authorities, these companies should
normally employ an international audit firm to carry out additional audits based on
international auditing standards and issue audit reports accordingly. This effectively
means that AB share companies are subject to a dual audit. The international audit
firms employed for B share companies should have a resident representative office
in China. The CPA firm performing A share audit and the international audit firm
could cooperate with each other during the audit, but they have to issue their audit
reports separately. However, the dual audit requirement is not mandatory until 2001,
although most companies chose to have dual audit before 2001. CSRC made the
dual audit requirement mandatory in 2001 and gave detailed guidelines on dual audit
in The Content and Format of Information Disclosure for Companies with Public

Offering No. 2-The Content and Format of Annual Report (2001 revised version).
According to the requirement, in addition to the audit by a domestic auditor, the
financial statements of AB share companies should also be audited by an
international CPA firm using International Auditing Standards.
In 2006, the Ministry of Finance and the International Accounting Standards Board
jointly made a press conference and announced that the new accounting and auditing
8

standards that would come into effect in 2007 and the implementation of the new
standards would achieve substantial convergence of accounting and auditing
standards in China with the International Accounting and Auditing Standards
(Huang, 2006). Due to the convergence of the accounting standards, the CSRC
issued the Notice on the Relevant Issue about the Auditing of the Companies that

Issue the Domestically Listed B-shares (2007) which effectively abolishes the
mandatory dual audit requirement for AB share companies because of the substantial
convergence of accounting and auditing standards and the desire to save audit fees
for companies. Starting from the fiscal year ended in 2007, AB share companies no
longer need to have two sets audit reports, although some have continued to do so
on a voluntary basis.

2. 2 AH Share Companies
Unlike AB share companies, AH share companies are subject to cross listing in both
Mainland China·and the Hong Kong securities markets and issue A shares and H
shares respectively. According to the listing rules in Mainland China and Hong
Kong, AH share companies have to prepare two sets of financial ·statements and
have them audited by auditors according to the respective requirements and
standards in each market until 2010. This means that prior to 2010, AH-share
companies have to prepare. two sets of financial statements in accordance with
Chinese GAAP and Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards (or International
9

Financial Reporting Standards) respectively and have them audited by domestic
auditors and auditors in Hong Kong in accordance with the respective auditing
standards. Thus, like AB share companies, AH share companies are also subject to
dual audit, although the auditors involved could be different.
In 2009, however, the Ministry of Finance and CSRC jointly issued the Pilot

Program for CPA firms to engage in H-share Audit(Pilot Program) under which
twelve CPA firms in China were allowed to perform audit service for H share firms.
To ensure the quality of the pilot H share audit, the Pilot Program sets six
requirements for CPA firms which want to apply for the H share audit qualification.
First, applicants must be qualified to audit securities and futures business activities.
Second, operational income in 2008 should not be ,less than 300 million (RMB)
among which income from audit services cannot be less than 200 million and
operating income from auditing securities activities should not be less than 50
million or maintain 30 or more listed companies as audit clients. Third, Chinese
CPAs in the applicants' firm should not be less than 400 and among which at least
300 of them qualified as CPAs through public examination. Fourth, no one
shareholder or partner obtains more than 25% ownership in the CPA firms. Fifth,
applicants have established and maintained a sound corporate governance, quality
control and internal control system. Sixth, the applicants must either have a member
firm in Hong Kong or belong to the same international CPA firms as a Hong Kong
audit firm. The final list is generated by Ministry of Finance and CSRC via
10

examination and verification, field visit and recommendations. The twelve Chinese
auditors' qualification to audit H shares effectively means that the dual audit
requirement for AH share companies becomes no longer mandatory following the
Joint Statement on the Alignment ofAccounting Standards for Mainland Enterprises
and Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards in 2007 (CASC and HKICPA,

2007). This indicates that from the fiscal year ended 2010, AH share companies can
choose to have only one set of financial statements prepared in accordance with the
accounting standards in Mainland China and engage one of the twelve mainland
CPA firms mentioned above to audit their financial statements using the auditing
standards in Mainland China. However, as of 2012, among the 82 AH-share
companies, 57 companies still choose to have two sets of financial statements and
two auditors for their financial reports, one domestic Chinese auditor and one Hong
Kong auditor.

2.3 Pure A Share Companies
Pure A share companies are listed only in Chinese stock market, either on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Only one· set of financial
statements and an audit report by a domestic auditor are required to be prepared for
these companies. To ensure quality, CPA firms must have a special license to be able
to audit listed companies in China. To be qualified to audit listed companies in
China, a CPA firm has to be legally formed for more than 3 years and maintain
11

sound quality control, internal management system and professional ethics. These
CPA firms must have at least 120 Chinese CPAs and not less than 80 of them
qualified through the unified nationwide qualification examination. At least 60 of
those 80 CPAs need to be qualified and have continuous practice for five years or
more. The operating income should not be less than 50 million, among which at
least 40 million are from audit services. It is also required that an audit firm for
listed companies in China should be composed of not less than 25 partners and more
than half of them have three-year or longer practice in this firm. In 2012, 54 CPA
firms were qualified to audit listed companies in the Chinese stoc.k market. Needless
to say, these are the better CPA firms in China. An example of qualified audit report
respectively for AB, AH and pure A share firms is attached in Appendix 2.
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Chapter 3 Literature Review

In this chapter, a comprehensive review of prior studies related to this thesis is

provided. I review the literature in four different fields, including audit quality, peer
pressure, dual audit as well as contagious effect.
3.1 Audit Quality
Audit quality has long been studied in the accounting and finance literature. Prior
research studies in China and other emerging markets have identified factors that
can significantly influence the quality of audits.
3.1.1 Audit firm and Client Firm Characteristics
Certain characteristics of the CPA firms affect the quality of the audits provided. For
example, Li, Song and Wong (2008) document a positive relation between audit firm
size measured by clients' total assets, total sales or total audit fees from clients and
auditors' propensity to issue modified audit opinions (MAOs) in the Chinese market.
Chan and Wu (2011) study the audit firm size effect via an examination of the
change in the frequency of MAOs following audit firm mergers. Their study
documents that auditor quality improves after multi-license mergers, in which at
least two constituent CPA firms to a merger have licenses to audit listed companies
because of the increase in the quasi rents at stake after such mergers. The impact of
CPA firms' legal form qn audit quality is also important. Firth et al. (2012) suggest
that auditors in a partnership CPA firm tend to be more conservative in issuing audit
opinions compared with auditors in a limited liability firm. However, no such
13

evidence is found by Lennox eta!. (2012) that CPA firms supply significantly lower
audit quality when they change from unlimited to limited liability form of firms in
UK.

Characteristics of client companies could also significantly affect auditor'
independence. and the quality of audits. For example, using data from East Asian
countries, Fan et a!. (2005) find evidence that auditors consider agency conflicts in a
company when they issue audit opinions. Poor profitability performance is more
likely to trigger MAOs in companies with separation between control and ownership
than those without such a separation because the former companies suffer from
higher agency conflicts.
3.1.2 Government Influences
In China, the influence from government does matter in audit quality. Prior studies
explore how CPA firms' association with government could affect auditor
independence. For example, an improvement in auditor independence and audit
quality has been documented after the disaffiliation program in China (Yang et a!.,
2001; Gul et a!., 2009). Chan et a!. (2006) examine whether auditor opinions are
affected by political and economic influences from local governments. They find
that local audit firms are more likely to suffer from influence from local
governments than their non-local counterparts due to their economic reliance on
local clients. Local auditors are inclined to report favorably on local governmentowned companies and companies tend to switch from a non-local auditor to a local
14

one after receiving MAOs. In addition, Chan, Lin and Wang (2012) docwnent that
local goverrnnent controlled companies are able to obtain more favorable audit
opinions from local auditors when they face the need for new equity financing or the
threat of delisting. Chan, Lin and Zhang (2007) suggest that the decrease in
goverrnnent ownership and corresponding increase in institutional ownership lead to
a general increase in the demand for high-quality audits in China's stock market.
Other factors that are also found to influence audit quality in China include auditclient importance, audit tenure, auditor switch etc. For example, Chen et al.(2010)
examines the association between audit quality and client's importance to the
company. They find that from 1995 to 2000, the individual auditor's propensity to
issue MAOs is negatively associated with client importance. However, from 2001 to
2004, the association turns to be positive with improvement in the institutional
environment. But they do not find significant evidence in the office and firm level.
Chen and Xia (2006) document an inverse "U" shape association between auditors'
tenure and the audit quality. They indicate that when the audit tenure.is less than 6
years, audit tenure has a positive impact on audit quality. The relationship turns to be
negative when the audit tenure is more than 6 years. Studies on auditor switches
explore how the various forms of auditor switches affect audit-client relationship
and audit quality. For example, Firth et al. (2012b) find that partners who rotate back
after a mandatory audit partner rotation treat former clients more favorably than
non-rotation-back cases. In a related study, Firth et al. (2012a) docwnent that firms
15

with mandatory audit partner rotations are associated with a significantly higher
likelihood of MAO than no-rotation firms in less developed regions in China.
Similar but weaker evidence is also found for voluntary audit firm rotations. Chen,
Su, and Wu (2009) study the audit quality in a 3-year period after a forced audit firm
change but with continued partner-client relationship. They indicate that clients with
greater earnings management activities are more likely to follow their audit partners
to a new firm, and in the first post-switch year, these followers are less likely to
report high earnings management items. However, the earnings management
increases in the next two post-switch years. Another study based on A-share
companies in China indicates that auditor switch is related to the conservatism ofthe
predecessor auditors and it could affect the independence of the successive auditors
(Liu and Liu, 2008). For companies reporting profit in the year of auditor change,
there is usually a significant increase in the discretionary accruals after the switch.
However, in companies reporting losses in the year of auditor switch, they take a
"big bath" to adjust lower earnings of the same year in expectation to report profit in
the following year.

3.2 Peer Pressure
Previous research has studied the impact of peer pressure on audit quality in
different contexts. Deis and Giroux (1992) find that CPA firms who are members of
AICPA Peer Review Section supply higher audit quality compared to those non16

member CPA firms. This indicates that auditors improve the quality of their work
when it is reviewed by a third party, which will result in a higher probability of audit
failure detection. Shafer et a!. (1999) document that auditors do feel the pressure
from peer review. The perceived pressure consequently restrains aggressive
reporting decisions. More recent literature examines the effectiveness of peer review
reports in· reflecting audit quality. Hilary and Lennox (2005) find that ·receiving
clean opinions from peer review helps audit firms in gaining clients, while modified
and adverse opinions lead to a loss of clients after peer review. Using data set from
an insurance company, Casterella et a!. (2009) document that AICPA's selfregulatory peer review effectively reflects the quality of services provided by CPA
firms. My thesis studies peer pressure in a different context, i.e. the pressure from a
second auditor of the same firm in a different capital market.

3.3 DualAudit
Using three-year data from 1999 to 2001, Li and Wu (2003) find no significant
difference in audit quality of statutory auditors among different patterns of dual
audit. Participation of Big 5 auditors does not improve auditor independence and
consequently audit quality. Lin et a!. (2014) document that companies with dual
audit are associated with less income-increasing discretionary accruals which
indicate higher audit quality. The audit quality is even higher when the two auditors,
domestic and international, are unaffiliated.
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3.4 Contagious Effect
There is not much accounting literature which specifically examines the contagious
effect in an auditing context. However, a spillover effect is widely studied in
literature. Prior studies examine the spillover effect between CPA firms' non-audit
services and audit work. Simunic (1984) tests the existence of the spillover effect
between management advisory services (MAS) and audit service by examining the
difference in fees paid by clients. He documents that CPA firms are paid more when
they provide combined audit and advisory services than for pure audit service which
indicates that MAS have spillover effect on the audit services and improve the audit
quality as a consequence. The spillover effect from one service to another service is
also supported by Davis et al. (1993) and Ezzamel, Gwilliam and Holland (1996).
However, Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy and Raghunandan (2003) find no
significant spillover effect between the non-audit and audit services after controlling
the endogenous selection problem. Other. studies examine the contagion effect.
Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson (2007) find the contagion. effect of share price decline
due to accounting restatements that have negative impacts on shareholder wealth
also lead the share price decline of firms in the same industry who do not restate
their accounting numbers. The contagion effect of the accounting restatements
induces investors to have concerns about the accounting credibility in the whole
industry. Francis and Michas (2013) document contagion effect of low-quality
audits. They find that low-quality audits in an audit office have contagion effect on

IS

the quality of audits conducted by the same office. Again, my thesis studies
contagious effect of a second auditor of the same firm in a different capital market.
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Chapter 4 Hypotheses Development

4.1 The Chinese Audit Market
The work of auditors in China is subject to the supervision from· the Chinese
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA), the Ministry of Finance and
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Practically, these regulatory
bodies cooperate with each other in monitoring the work of auditors in China and in
rendering sanctions where appropriate. According to the 2012 investigation report
by CICPA, sanctions to individual auditors and audit firms are basically in three
forms, namely, public condemnation, informed criticism and admonition.
China has adopted similar ethical requirements for auditors of listed companies as in
many developed markets including requirements on independence, integrity,
objectivity, professional competence and confidentiality. However, according to
Shafer (2008), auditors in China, especially those in local firms, are more likely to
consider aggressive actions as ethical and express intentions to commit similar
actions. Aggressive judgments on acceptable actions could have negative impact on
the quality of audits they provide. For example, they could set higher acceptable
level of discretionary accruals in their clients' financial statements than their
counterparts in other markets.
CSRC requires that all listed companies in China must be audited by Chinese CPAs.
However, because of the rela\ively weak institutional environment in China
compared with other industrialized nations, the quality of Chinese audits has long
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been of the concern for various stakeholders, especially for small and medium CPA
firms. Most auditing firms in China were initially set up or sponsored by
government agencies at different levels. The operations of these firms were
frequently

intervened by government agencies which compromised their

independence and consequently the quality of their audits (Chen, 2004; Lin, 2004).
Generally speaking, these CPA firms were quite small in size. To solve this problem,
Chinese government introduced reforms of CPA practices since 1997. These reforms
include encouragement of mergers of CPA firms, and disaffiliation of CPA firms
from their government sponsors. These reforms help enhance the independence of
CPA firms in China and improve their audit quality (Lin eta!., 2003).
Nevertheless, despite the improvement in the governance and supervision for CPA
firms, the overall institutional environment in China is still perceived to be weak
compared with many developed countries. The capital market and the operation of
companies in China are not subject to sufficient supervision from institutional
investors. Institutional investors, especially those long-term investors are generally
well informed and knowledgeable. They normally keep a close eye on the operation
and corporate governance of firms including the audit of companies they invest in.
According to Guo (2012), the chairman ofCSRC, by the end of2011, only 15.6% of
the circulated A shares were held by institutional investors while in developed
market, institutional investors held around 70% of the market capitalization among
which half were long-term investors including pension funds and insurance
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companies.

4.2 International Well-Renowned CPA firm Groups
To join in as a member of an international CPA firm group, a CPA firm has to fulfil
the criteria set by the group for its members. International CPA organizations usually
have requirements for members on size, experience and service quality. For
example, Crowe Horwath (2014) states that:

Elite firms in the Crowe Horwath International organization have been selected
through a rigorous approval process. This includes providing evidence of
impeccable service, exhibiting the highest quality standards of operation and
delivery, illustrating industry leadership through peer review, as well as
demonstrating superior management competency as evidenced by awards such as
honors as employer of choice and valued member of their business community.
In addition to the quality control of member firms in the selection stage, members of
an international CPA firm organization are also subject to continuous supervision
after they have gained membership. As all members in a group bear the same brand
name, international CPA groups are inclined to have rigorous continuous
examination on the eligibility of their members to avoid possible damage to their
brand names and reputation. Moreover, international CPA firm organizations have
internal system for information and knowledge exchange among members and
provide continuous standardized training. These continuous supervision and training
ensure a high service quality provided worldwide. Thus, members of international
CPA firm groups are normally subject to the influence from a strong quality
assurance environment.
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4.3 The Hong Kong Audit Market
AH shares are audited by CPA firms in Hong Kong and the non-Big N international
auditors of most (70% to 80%) AB share firms are also Hong Kong CPA firms. The
institutional environment in Hong Kong is thus of great importance to the audit
quality supplied by the international auditors for AH and AB firms.
Firms listed in Hong Kong are subject to the co-supervision from five mam
regulatory authorities, namely, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission
(HKSFC), the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), the Hong Kong Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (HKICPA), the Financial Reporting Council(FRC) and
the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC). 4
HKSFC and HKSE have legal powers to monitor and investigate the audits of
companies listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In practice, they often refer
suspected cases to the HKICPA for further investigation (Ke eta!., 2012). HKICPA,
as the statutory licensing and standard promulgating body for the accounting
profession in Hong Kong, regulates the conducts of its members and maintains
investigatory power over audits of non-listed companies. After the establishment of
FRC, the power of investigating the audits and the accounting records for listed
companies passes to the FRC. ICAC is responsible for receiving and considering
allegations of corruptions and investigating the alleged offenses.
As explained above, overall, the institutional environment in China appears to be
4

The FRC was established on I December 2006. It became fully operational on 16 July 2007. AH
share firms are subject to its supervision after that.
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weaker than that of Hong Kong and many developed markets. Hong Kong and
international auditors are often subject to a more established system of supervisions,
from investors to regulatory bodies to provide high quality service. The dual audit in
China enables the international auditors with high audit quality to examine the
financial statement of the same client and issue audit opinion accordingly. This
unique setting could entice domestic auditors to improve their audit quality as they
have to justify themselves if they issue audit opinions different from the
international auditors. The international auditors thus effectively create peer pressure
on the domestic auditors. I therefore argue that the audit engagement of Hong Kong
or international auditors who often operate in a stronger institutional environment
have a spillover effect on the quality of A-share audits when these companies are
subject to dual audit. Thus, my first hypothesis on dual audit effect based on the
above discussions is as follows:

Hl: The quality of A-share audit is higher for AB/H share companies whose
domestic and international auditors are non-Big N CPA firms than for pure A share
companies which hire non-Big N domestic auditors.

4.4 Big N versus Non-Big N Auditors
Big four (or Big N) CPA firms ;are found to supply higher audit quality to their
clients compared with their non-Big 4 (or non-Big N) competitors. Big 4 (or Big N)
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CPA firms have more large clients and obtain better capability in hiring talented and
skilled employees compared with other smaller CPA firms. As Big N audit firms
have larger pool of clients and hence they have more incentives to protect their
reputation to avoid loss of clients in a large scale and possible litigation by providing
higher quality services. DeAngelo (1981) finds that audit firms in larger size tend to
supply higher audit quality as they have more to lose in audit failures than smaller
audit firms. Several studies find consistent evidence using various measures of audit
quality. Palrnrose (1988) suggests that Big eight CPA firms are less likely to have
litigation activities than non-Big eight auditors. Accounting information that has
been reviewed by Big N firms is perceived by the market to be more credible
inferring from market's more active response to earnings in firms with Big N
auditors (Teoh and Wong, 1993). Using analysts' earnings forecast accuracy and
forecast dispersion, Behn et al. (2008) find that Big 5 auditors are associated with
better analysts forecast performance. Lennox and Pittman (2010) find that Big 5
audits are associated with less likelihood of accounting fraud.
As Big N auditors maintain high audit quality and the dual audit policy in China
enables the domestic non-Big N auditor and the Big N international auditor to
provide audit service to the same client, the Big N international auditor effectively
plays the supervisory role by providing a reference to the work of non-Big N
domestic auditors. I therefore argue that the high quality audit of Big N international
auditors have contagious effect on the audit quality of domestic non-Big N domestic
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auditors (i.e. the A-share audit). Hence, I formulate the second hypothesis on
contagious effect that is as follows:

H2: The quality of A-share audit is higher for an AB!H share company which hires a
non-Big N domestic auditor and a Big N international auditor than for an ABIH
share company which only hires non-Big N domestic and international auditors.
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Chapter 5 Research Design

5.1 Sample Selection and Data
My sample includes all non-financial A-share firms listed on the main boards of the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2001-2012. The sample period
begins in 2001, the year when the audit environment in China becomes relatively
mature and stable. Chen, Sun and Wu (2010) witness great improvements in the
institutional environment in Chinese market, especially in investor protection since
2001. Auditors began to face significant litigation risk arising from accounting fraud
and audit failure starting from 2001 (Chen, 2003). In addition, CPA firms have
almost completed their mergers prior to 2001. According to Chan and Wu (20 11 ),
CPA firm mergers peaked in 2000 and there were only a few more mergers in 2001
and thereafter. This period (2001-2012) also covers the most updated financial report
information for listed companies.
I collected the auditor, audit opinion, financial information and corporate
governance information about sample firms from _the China Stock Market and
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and the WIND database along with other
sources, including financial statements of the sample firms and websites of
regulatory bodies. Only firm years with non-Big N domestic auditors are included in
my sample. Firms in financial sector are excluded from my sample due to their
special regulatory and reporting environments. AB/H share firm observations
without dual audit and observations with negative equity are not included either.
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5.2 Specification of Regression Models
To test my hypotheses, ·I use two commonly used measures of audit quality in
accounting literature as proxies for the audit quality in this study, namely, the
frequency of Modified Audit Opinions (MAOs) and the Earnings Response
Coefficients (ERCs) (Firth et a!., 2007; Chan and Wu, 2011; Chen, Sun and Wu,
2010; Gul eta!., 2009; Firth eta!., 2012). I include a number of control variables
which were found in prior studies to have significant impacts on audit quality in
prior literature.
5.2.1 Modified Audit Opinions (MAOs)
Auditors are hired by companies to express opinions on whether the financial
statements are prepared in accordance with accounting and legal requirements.
Management of client companies will try their best to avoid MAOs for their
financial reports since MAOs will generate suspicion and attract scrutinies from
regulatory bodies and investors. Due to management's ability to influence the
appointment of auditors for audit engagements, auditors could be under pressure not
to issue MAOs. Hence, the audit opinions in the financial reports are often the
products of negotiations between the management and the auditors .. Management's
strong preference for unqualified audit opinions and auditors' professional insistence
to issue proper audit opinions make the auditors' propensity to issue MAOs a
significant challenge and an appropriate proxy for auditor independence and audit
quality.
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Consistent with prior literature, MAOs include unqualified opinion with an
explanatory paragraph, qualified, disclaimer and adverse audit opinions (Chan and
Wu, 2011; Firth et a!., 2012). Auditors who maintain higher audit quality have
propensity to issue more MAOs than their counterparts (DeFend et a!., 2000; Chan
eta!., 2006; Gul eta!., 2009; Chan and Wu, 2011). I estimate the following probit
models to test my hypotheses.

MAO= ao+ a1DUAL+L: aj Control Variables +e

(1)

MAO= f3 o+ fJ1BigN +L: {Jj Control Variables +e

(2)

where MAO is coded one if a firm in the sample receives an MAO for the firm's A
share financial statement in the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. DUAL is a dummy
variable which equals one if a firm has both A shares and B (or H) shares during the
year and hires a non-Big N domestic and a non-Big N international auditor
respectively for its A and B (or H) share financial reports, and zero if the firm is a
pure A share company hiring a non-Big N domestic auditor. BigN is also a dummy
variable that takes the value of one to indicate that an A share company that also has
B (or H) shares during the year and hires a non-Big N domestic and a Big N
international auditor, and zero if an AB/H share firm which hires only non-Big N
domestic and non-Big N internati()nal auditors. Equation (1) is used to test the dual
audit effect (Hypothesis 1) while equation (2) is used to test the contagious effect
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(Hypothesis 2). If there is dual audit effect that suggests dual audit improves audit
quality, fum-years with dual audit should more likely receive a MAO comparing
with pure A share firms which are only audited by a domestic auditor during the year.
after controlling other factors which may influence the issuance of MAOs. Hence, I
expect the coefficient of DUAL, ~ 1 • to be positive. Similarly, if contagious effect
exists, AB/H share firms which hire a non-Big N domestic auditor and a Big N
international auditor should have higher audit quality than AB/H share firms which
hire only non-Big N domestic and non-Big N international auditors. Therefore, ~2 is
expected to be positive as well.

Control Variables

Following previous research in financial reporting, various control variables that are
found to have impacts on a firm's probability ofreceiving a MAO are included (Li,
Song and Wong, 2008; Chen, Sun and Wu, 2010; Chan and Wu, 2011).
(1) Financial Statement Variables
I include the following financial statement variables as control variables, Size
(natural log of total asset), LOSS (a dummy variable equals to one when the firm
report a loss, zero otherwise), ARINV (receivables and inventory divided by total
assets), ROE (return on equity, net income divided by shareholder equity), LEV
(total liabilities divided by total assets) and TURN (sales divided by total assets).
Large clients are usually less risky for auditors because of their more stable
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operations and better internal control system. However, Chen et a!. (20 10) find a
positive association between client importance and auditors' propensity to issue
MAOs from 2001 to 2004 when the institutional environment in China becomes
more investor friendly. Thus, no predication on the direction of the association
between SIZE and MAO is made. In general, a higher level of TURN, ROE
indicates a lower degree of audit risk. Thus, the coefficients on these variables are
expected to be negative. As higher level of ARINV is associated with higher audit
complexity and audit risk, a positive coefficient is expected. Higher Leverage level
and incurrence of loss are generally associated with higher audit risk. I thus expect a
positive sign on the coefficients of Lev and Loss. Age, defined as the number of
years between a firm's year of initial public offering and the fiscal year is also
included. Conflicting evidences are documented in the literature regarding the
relationship between firm age and likelihood to experience financial distress.
Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich (1987) find that young firms are more likely to
experience financiaLdifficulties. Whereas results in other studies suggest that the
longer a firm is listed, the more likely the firm becomes financially distressed which
indicates a higher probability of receiving MAOs (DeFond et a!., 2000; Murray,
1995). Thus, I do not make prediction on the sign of the coefficient on AGE.
(2) Stock Market Variables
To capture those influences on the issuance of MAOs which are not captured by the
financial statement control variables, I include two stock market variables. The first
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variable is RET defined as the market-adjusted stock return for the fiscal year. RET
controls the news or information that has not been reflected by a firm's earning but
has been recognized by the market and reflected in the change of market return. As
larger RET means better news and lower audit risk for a firm, RET is expected to be
negatively associated with MAO. The other variable is STDR which measures
market risk of returns. To determine the variable STDR, I first estimate the market
model for each firm using weekly stock return data during the fiscal year. I then
obtain the standard deviation of residuals from the market model estimated. STDR
captures risks not incorporated in the financial statement variables. Higher STDR
suggests higher risk and higher likelihood to receive MAOs as a result. Hence, I
expect a positive association between STDR and MAO.
(3) Corporate Governance Variables
The corporate governance of a company can influence management's behavior and
consequently the audit risk. I include three variables to control the influence of
corporate governance environment on audit quality, Indep, Concurrent and EXE.
Indep is the percentage of independent directors in the boardroom. Concurrent is a
dummy variable equals to one if the CEO and board chairman are different persons
and zero otherwise. EXE is the percentage of shareholdings by executives in a firm.
In firms where management's actions are closely and effectively monitored,
managers' opportunities to benefit their own wealth at the cost of shareholders like
some fraudulent schemes should be constrained. Hence, such firms are less likely to
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receive MAOs. A higher proportion of independent directors in the board, separation
of CEO and board chairman duties and higher shareholdings by executives are
found to enhance corporate governance and align the management's interest with
shareholders' welfare. Therefore, Indep, Concurrent and EXE are expected to be
negatively associated with the dependent variable MAO. However, prior research
also found that in firms with low level of independent directors on board and the
CEO and board chairman positions being served by one person, the management
have more bargaining power with auditors to constrain auditors' issue of MAOs
(Carcello and Neal, 2000). Accordingly, the sign of coefficients on Indep and
Concurrent will be an empirical question.
(4) Government Influence
It is widely evidenced in prior studies that the audit quality in Chinese market does

suffer from the influence from government (Chan et al., 2006; Gul et al., 2009;
Chan, Lin and Wang, 2012). SOE, a dummy variable equals one if the controlling
shareholder of a firm is government either local or central, and zero otherwise, is
included to control the influence from government on· auditors' propensity to issue
MAOs. Firms that are politically or economically connected with government are
able to obtain more favorable audit opinions and thus less likely to have MAOs.
Hence, a negative coefficient is expected on SOE.
(5) Audit Firm Characteristics
As prior research finds that audit firm characteristics like size and legal form could
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influence the quality of services provided by auditors. Thus, I include three variables
to control impact of the A-share audit firm characteristics on audit quality. First, I
have Bigl 0 to capture the effect of A-share auditor size on audit quality. Bigl 0 is a
dummy variable, which is equal to one if the A-share financial report is audited by
one of the Big 10 CPA firms in the fiscal year. The classification is based on the
CICPA annual ranking from 2002 onwards. The 2001 classification is based on the
ranking in 2002 as CICPA did not issue any CPA firms' ranking until 2002. As I
have observed, most of the rankings do not change drastically over years. A positive
sign is expected on this variable as larger auditors are inclined to provide higher
audit quality. The second control variable is FORM, which control the effect of
different legal forms of CPA firms on their audit quality. This dummy variable takes
the value of one when the auditors bear unlimited liability in an audit failure and 0
otherwise. 5 Firth et al. (20 12) find that auditors with unlimited liability are more
conservative. Thus, a positive sign is expected on FORM. I also include SWITCH, a
dummy which equals 1 if the audit firm of a company in current fiscal year is
different from last year and 0 otherwise. I use this variable to control the impact of
auditor switch on audit quality.
(6) Industry and Year Dummy
I use these variables to control the industry and year effects. Industry is a dummy

5

The classification is based on the title of each CPA firm in A-share audit reports and cross-checked
with website of the CPA firm and disclosure by related regulatory bodies. Unlimited CPA firms in
China are in two forms, general partnership and special general pa1tnership.
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variable coded I when a firm is from a manufacturing industry, and zero
otherwise.

6

Manufacturing companies and non-manufacturing companies are

different in terms of competitive environment, assets structure, nature of business,
etc. 7 Eleven year dummy variables are included in the estimation model.
5.2.2 Earnings Response Coefficients (ERCs)
Earnings response coefficient is used to examine market's reaction to the earnings of
a firm in the financial statements. It measures the informativeness ot the earnings.
Strictly speaking, ERC is a measure .of earnings quality. In accounting literature,
earnings quality is widely used as proxy for audit quality (Myers eta!., 2003; Chung
and Kallapur, 2003; Ghosh and Moon, 2005). According to agency theory, managers
in a company have incentives to serve their own benefits even at the cost of
shareholders. They may achieve it through manipulating the earnings. When audit
quality is high, management's earnings management faces higher risk of being
detected. Thus, high audit quality could constrain earnings management of a firm.
As a result, it is reasonable to draw reference about audit quality from earnings
quality that higher earnings quality should be associated with higher audit quality.
Earnings quality measurements in literature are generally either accounting based
like abnormal accruals or market based like ERC. I use the market-based
6

The classification of manufacturing and non-manufacturing industry is based on CSRC industry
classification. Observations with CSRC industry code starting with letter C are in manufacturing
industry.
7
Due to the small sample size in the contagious effect tests, especially in the tests using the PSM
method, it is not feasible to adopt industry classifications which were used in many previous studies,
as this will result in too many variables in terms of the matched subsample size in contagious effect
tests using PSM.
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measurement to provide additional evidence about the impact of dual audit and
contagious effects on audit quality as MAO is basically an accounting-based
measure. When a firm has high audit quality, its earnings information should be
more closely related to the firm's capital market performance and this in turn should
better facilitate investors' decision making. Investors tend to be more sensitive and
respond more actively to the earnings announcements of firms with high audit
quality. I use the following models to test my hypotheses. Model (3) tests the impact
of dual audit on ERC, a proxy for audit quality, while Model (4) tests the contagious
effect.

CAR=yo+Y1jj,E +y2DUAL+y1jj,E* DUAL+'i.yiControl Variables+t:

(3)

CAR=8 0 +8 1jj,E +82BigN+81jj,E* BigN+'i. oi Control Variables+t:

(4)

where CAR is the cumulative abnormal return. To get CAR, I first estimate market
model parameters a and

~

for each individual firm using the weekly stock return

without cash dividend reinvested in year t-1. Observations are dropped if less than
15 weekly return data is available in year t-1. Then the weekly return is obtained by
subtracting a and

~Rmt

from the weekly return of each firm. I cumulate the weekly

abnormal return to get CAR (as shown in equation (5)). The weekly data is used as
there are only 12 observations tq estimate the market model for each company if
monthly figures are used. The estimation may have more biases. Estimation with
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daily figures may not clearly show the overall trend of the data. Thus, weekly
figures are used in the CAR calculation as the best compromise.

(5)

where i is firm i and t is the week from month -8 to month 4 where month 0 is the
fiscal year-end. I begin with the fifth month after the fiscal year-end of t-1 and
ending four months after the fiscal year-end to enable investors to incorporate the
annual earnings information. According to the Rules of Contents and Format of
Information Disclosure by Companies Offering Securities No. 2 issued by CSRC,
companies offering securities should publish annual reports in website specified by
CSRC and summaries of financial reports in at least one of the specified newspaper
within four months after the accounting year. As all listed companies in China have
fiscal year end on December 31, this effectively means that all annual reports and
summaries of financial reports should be published before the end of April. I use the
data from May to April to calculate CAR to incorporate market's reaction (to the
earnings information reported in the annual report) into the measurement. Using
data from January to December may induce bias as investors do not have earnings
information until the release of annual report.
!:J.E is the change in the annual earnings deflated by the firm's market value of

equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. DUAL and BigN are the same as defined
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in the MAO model as dummy variables to indicate whether there is dual audit and
contagious effects respectively. The coefficients of t.E, Y1 and 15}, respectively assess
the earning response coefficient for pure A firms (DUAL equals 0) and AB/H share
firms with non-Big N international auditors (BigN equals 0). y 1 and 15 1 are expected
to be positive according to prior research (Firth, Fung and Rui, 2007; Hanlon,
Maydew and Shevline, 2008). y 3 and OJ respectively represent the incremental effect
of dual audit effect and contagious effect (i.e. having Big N international auditors)
on investors' responsiveness to firms' earnings. I hypothesize that the A-share audit
quality improves through dual audit and the contagious effect on the work of nonBig N domestic auditors from Big N international auditors. Thus, I expect the
coefficients of the interaction terms t.E* DUAL and t.E* BigN to be positive and
significant.

Same as the MAO models, a number of variables that are found to have impacts on
the association between change in earnings and stock returns are_included_as_control
variables to control their influences on the association between the test variables and
dependent variable. First, I have BV, the book value of equity per share at the end of
fiscal year. Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) find that stock price is positively
related to earnings and book value. Thus, a positive coefficient is expected on BV.
Growth' is defined as the market Vfllue to book value ratio of equity at the fiscal year
end. It captures the growth opportunities for a firm. It is easier for fast growing firms
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to engage in earnings manipulation than it is for mature firms since it is difficult to
monitor the business activities of fast growing firms (Collins and Kothari, 1989;
Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). Thus, a negative association is expected between
Growth and the dependent variable. Other control variables including SIZE, LEV,
Indep, Concurrent, EXE are as defined earlier. Current is the current assets divided
by current liabilities. The different levels of financial liquidity imply different level
of risk for investors. Therefore, I expect Current to be positively and LEV to be
negatively associated with ERC (Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). The impact of fum
size on market returns is mixed in literature (Warfield eta!., 1995; Firth eta!., 2007).
So, no directional prediction is made on the coefficient of SIZE. Higher percentage
of independent directors, separation of board chairman and CEO duties and higher
level of executive shareholdings are found to be associated with better corporate
governance which constrains management's earnings management. Consequently,
investors are inclined to react more actively to the earnings changes of these firms
perceived to be with better corporate governance. Hence, positive coefficients are
expected on these three variables. STDR is also included as well to capture the risks
not incorporated in the financial statement variables. To be consistent with the
measurement of CAR, the STDR used in tests based on ERC will be the standard
deviation of residuals from the market model estimated using weekly stock return
from month -8 to month 4, where month 0 is the fiscal year end. SOE is also
included as in MAO model to capture the possible influence from government. The
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three audit firm characteristics variables are also included in ERC model to control
their influence on the earnings informativeness.

5.3 Self-Selection Bias
Whether to have both A shares and B (or H) shares or to hire a Big N auditor are
subject to firms' own choices. To address the potential self-selection bias, I use the
two-stage Heckman (1979) approach as well as Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
method (Chaney et al., 2004; Lawrence et al., 2011; Kim, Chung and Firth, 2003;
Lennox et al., 2012; Chan and Wu, 2011) to estimate the probability of a firm
choosing to have both A shares and B (or H) shares and the probability of hiring a
Big N CPA firm as the international auditor.
DUAL= J.l.o+ J11 Sales__growth+ J.1.2SIZE+ J.1.3Lev + J.i.4TURN + J.i.sROE+ /16Loss
+ 111ARINV+ /lsCASH+ /19Indep+ 11wConcurrent+ 11uEXE
(6)

+ 1112 Industry+ lli Year+ e

BigN= A.o+ A.1SIZE+ A.2 TURN+ A.3LEV+ ~CURR+ A.sLosst-1 + A.6ROA
+ A7 Indep+ A.sConcurrent + AgEXE+ A.wRightst+l
+ A.uMAOt-1 + A.12 Industry+ A.; Year+ e

(7)

Equation (6) is the selection model to estimate the firm's probability to choose to
have both A shares and B (or H) shares listed while equation (7) estimates the
probability of hiring a Big N international auditor. Sales_growth is defined as the
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percentage change in sales between the current fiscal year and the year before.
CURR and CASH respectively represent the percentage of current asset and cash or
cash equivalents in total assets. Losst-1 is a dummy variable indicating whether the
firm reports a loss in year t-1 where t is the fiscal year. MA0,_ 1 represents whether
the firm receives modified audit opinion in year t-I. Rights,+! equals to one if a firm
have a rights issue in the year after the fiscal year and 0 otherwise. Firms planning to
have rights issue next year tend to be more likely to hire Big N auditors to enhance
the credibility of the financial information. Other variables were as defined earlier.
In the Heckman two-stage procedure, I estimate Equation (6) or Equation (7) first.
Then I compute the inverse Mills ratio, Lambda, based on the results of the first
stage estimation. In the second stage, I include the inverse Mills ratio, Lambda, as a
control variable to correct for possible self-selection bias.
In propensity score matching method, the two equations are used to select the
observations in treatment and control groups that will be further used in the main
test. I first predict the propensity for a firm to choose to have A shares and B (or H)
shares listed or to choose a Big N international auditor based on the model defined.
Then I match each observation in the treatment group with an observation in the
control group with very close propensity. I constrain the propensity difference to be
less than 0.1 percent. Consequently, I will obtain a subsample of firms composing of
the pairwise observations from 'the treatment and the control groups with similar
firm characteristics.
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Chapter 6 Empirical Results

The overall organization of this chapter is given in Figure I. I test two effects, dual
audit effect and contagious effect and use two measures of audit quality, MAO and
ERC. Two methods are employed to control for self-selection, Heckman two-stage
method and PSM method.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
6.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests
Table 1, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable MAO
and the univariate test for the sample. I have 13,540 pure A share firm-year
observations, 287 observations for AB/H share firms which hire non-Big N domestic
and international auditors and 172 AB/H share firms that hire non-Big N domestic
auditors and Big N international auditors. As showed in the table, the mean of MAO
is 0.061 and 0.157 for pure A share firms and AB/H share firms with only non-Big N
auditors respectively while it is 0.099 for AB/H share firms with Big N international
auditors. The portion of observations that have MAO is 6.1 %, 15.7% and 9.9% for
pure A share firm, AB/H share firm with non-Big N international auditor and AB/H
share firm with Big N international auditor, respectively. These numbers are similar
when firm-year observations with Big N domestic auditors and firms in financial
industry are included, which would be 7.7% versus 15.8% for pure A share and
AB/H share firms respectively, while this figure is 7.8% for all main-board listed A
share firms in the twelve-year period.
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(Insert Table 1 here)
Table 1 panel B displays the descriptive statistics for all the independent variables.
AB/H share firms with non-Big N international auditor rank the highest in terms of
firm size, leverage and asset turnover among three groups. 21% of AB/H sample
firm-year observations reported loss while this figure is only 11.43% for pure A
share firms. From the table, some other characteristics could also be observed. AB/H
share firms (non-Big N) set aside a higher portion for accounts receivables and
inventories in their asset structure than pure A share firms. In terms of corporate
governance aspects, I found that pure A share firms have the highest percentage of
independent directors in their boardrooms and executives and top managers in pure
A share firms hold more company shares measured as their shareholdings over the
total shares outstanding. The mean market-adjusted stock return is positive for pure
A share firms and AB/H share firms with Big N international auditors but negative
for AB/H share firms which hire non-Big N international auditors. Differences of
independent variables mentioned are all significant at 1% level. Mean differences in
the remaining three independent variables including ROE, Concurrent and STDR
are not significant. It is interesting that AB/H share firms with non-Big N
international auditors are more likely to hire unlimited liability and larger CPA firms
for their A-share audit than AB/H share firms with Big N international auditors. It
may indicate that AB/H share

fir~s

recognize the high audit quality of international

Big N auditors and have lower demand for high quality A-share audit.
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Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent variable and all the
independent variables. The dependent variable MAO is significantly correlated with
most of the independent variables except the Concurrent variable, which indicates
whether the firm CEO and board chairman are the same person and the STDR
variable which captures the risk not reflected in financial statements. It is clear in the
correlation matrix the dependent variable MAO is as expected to be positively and
significantly correlated with the experimental variable DUAL. MAO is also
negatively and significantly related to financial statement variables SIZE, TURN,
ROE and corporate governance variables Indep and EXE as well as market variable
RET. The negative correlations suggest that larger firms with better performance and
liquidity are less likely to receive non-clean audit opinion from their auditors. The
corporate governance variables' negative sign suggests that the higher the level of
independent directors in the boardroom and the executives' shareholdings, the less
likely will the firm receive modified opinion. Furthermore, the negative correlation
for RET means that auditors are less likely to modify their opinion when there are
more good news recognized by investors but not yet incorporated in earnings. The
remaining variables including LEV, LOSS, ARINV SWITCH are positively and
significantly associated with auditors' propensity to issue modified opinion. The
positive correlations are consistent with prior studies that higher leverage and
occurrence of loss bring higher degree of audit risk and induce higher probability for
audit opinion to be modified. High percentage of accounts receivable and inventory
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in the asset structure increases audit complexity and higher possibility of non-clean
audit opinion consequently. Firms with auditor switch are more likely to receive
MAO. As there are some significant correlations between independent variables
(e.g. correlation between RET and STDR), I use variance inflation factor(VIF) to
test if there may be a multicollinearity problem. The result shows that the largest
VIF is 2.87 which indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem in my regression
analysis. 8
(Insert Table 2 here)

6.2 Multivariate Analysis---MAOs
6.2.1 Dual Audit effect---Heckman Two-Stage Model
Table 3 presents the multivariate regression result for the dual audit effect testing
using the Heckman two-stage selection model. Table 3 panel A reports the result of
the stage-one probit estimation of firms choosing to have both A shares and B (or H)
shares listed. The year dummies are included in the estimation but the results are not
reported. I find the coefficients of SIZE, TURN, LEV, LOSS and Indep are positive
and significant. Therefore, firms with both A and B (or H) shares tend to be larger,
with higher turnover and leverage, and report loss more frequently than their pure A
counterparts. These firms also leave more seats for independent directors in their
boardroom. The result also shows that EXE is negatively associated with firms
8

According to common rule of thumb, further investigation is necessary when a VIF is larger than 4
and a VIF exceeding I 0 suggests serious multicollinearity problem (Kutner eta!., 2004).
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having both A shares and B (or H) shares listed. It means that management in AB/H
firms hold less percentage of company shares compared with their peers in the pure
A share firms. The coefficients of the remaining five variables are insignificant.
(Insert Table 3 here)
Table 3 panel B shows the second-stage estimation results. The result shows that the
coefficient on the experimental variable, DUAL, is positive and significant at 5%
level. It suggests that A share auditors have higher propensity to zssue MAOs to
firms with dual audit compared with their pure A share clients who are only audited
by the domestic auditors. Thus, I could draw reference from the result that firms

with dual audit are associated with higher audit quality. Hypothesis 1 is supported
that the A share audit quality is higher for AB/H firms being audited by both
domestic and international auditors than pure A share firms.
The coefficients of control variables are also reported in Table 3 Panel B. In
particular, the coefficients on SIZE, LEV and LOSS are as expected and significant.
It is consistent with the expectations that smaller firms and firms with higher
leverage level and incurring a loss in the fiscal year are with higher level of audit
risk and more likely to receive MAOs as a result. TURN, RET are as expected to be
negatively associated with MAO. It's consistent with prior studies that firms with
higher turnover ratio, more good news not recognized in earnings are characterized
as firms with lower audit risk. The variable Age is positively and significantly
correlated with MAO. It supports that younger listed firms in China are less likely to
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receive MAOs (DeFond et al. 2000; Chan and Wu, 2011). The positive and
significant coefficient on STDR is consistent with prior research findings that STDR
represents additional risks to a firm apart from risks captured by financial statement
variables. The results for the three corporate governance variables Concurrent, Indep
and EXE are insignificant. Industry and year dummies are controlled in this model
but not reported with detail. SOE which captures a firm's association with
government, is negatively associated with MAO. It indicates that the association
with government influence auditor independence and auditors are less likely to issue
MAO to government-connected firms. Auditor switch have significant effect on
probability of receiving MAO. New auditors are more likely to issue MAOs.
6.2.2 Dual Audit Effect--- Propensity Score Matching
In this section, I first estimate the selection model as specified in equation (6) to
predict the propensity for an A share firm choosing to have both A shares and B (or
H) shares listed. Then I use the result from the estimation to match each AB/H share
firm with a pure A share firm. To ensure the AB/H group is closely matched with the
pure A share group, I constrain the differences in the predicted probabilities to be
less than 0.1 %. I have 564 pairwise AB/H and pure A share firm-year observations
matched. That means 282 AB/H and 282 pure A share firm-year observations will be
included in the next-step estimation. To ensure these two groups are really closely
matched with each other, I use univariate t test to see whether these two groups have
significant differences in the mean values of the independent variables in equation
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(6). Table 4 panel A shows the result of the t test. It is clear that the mean value
differences of all independent variables in equation (6) are insignificant. It suggests
that I have matched these two groups successfully and been able to correct the
possible selectivity problem.
(Insert Table 4 here)
Table 4 panel B shows the result of the estimation of equation (1) using the 282 pairs
of matched observations. The result is similar to that of the Heckman two-stage
selection model. My main interest is the coefficient on DUAL which is as expected
to be positive and significant at 1% level, supporting hypothesis 1. Dual audit is
again shown to improve the A-share audit quality in China market. The results for
most of the control variables are similar using the two different methods to control
the potential selection problem. However, the coefficient on ARINV, turns out to be
significant in this propensity score matching estimation. The corporate governance
variables, Indep and EXE, still have no significant impact on auditors' propensity to
issue MAOs. However, it is interesting to find that the Concurrent variable is
positively associated with the probability of receiving MAOs. It's consistent with
the prior finding that one person holds both the CEO and board chairman position in
a firm could have higher bargaining power with auditors to reduce non-clean audit
opinions (Carcello and Neal, 2000).
To summarize, the results of both the Heckman two-stage selection model and
propensity score matching estimation support hypothesis one that the audit quality
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of A-share financial statements measured as auditors' propensity to issue MAOs, is
higher for AB/H firms with dual audit than pure A share firms.
6.2.3 Contagious Effect--- Heckman Two- stage Model
Table 5 shows the results of contagious effect on probability of receiving MAOs.
Panel A shows the results of the first-stage probit regression. SIZE and LEV are
significantly associated with the choice to hire Big N international auditors. It
suggests that firms of larger size and with lower leverage level are more likely to
hire Big N international auditors. Firms have Big N international auditors also have
lower asset turnover and more current assets in the asset structure.
(Insert Table 5 here)
Table 5 Panel B reports the second-stage regression results. 9 The coefficient on
BigN is negative but insignificant. It indicates no sufficient evidence that hiring a
Big N international auditor significantly affects the probability of receiving MAOs.
6.2.4 Contagious Effect--- Propensity Score Matching
In this section, I first use model specified in Equation (7) to obtain the propensity
score for each firm-year observation and match the treatment group in which AB/H
share firms hiring non-Big N domestic auditors and Big N international auditors are
included and control group which consists of AB/H firms hiring non-Big N domestic
and non-Big N international auditors with no replacement. The matched pairs will
be further used in the main tests of the contagious effect. Table 6 Panel A shows the
9

One Control variable, the percentage of independent directors on the board, is excluded from the
regression due to its high correlation with a year dummy.
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univariate t test of the independent variables in Equation (7). There is no significant
difference .of the mean values of the variables between the two groups in the
matched sample. It indicates that firms in these two groups are similar in
characteristics specified in Equation (7) which could influence a firm's decision
whether to have a Big N or a non-Big N international auditor.
(Insert Table 6 here)
Table 6 Panel B shows the results of contagious effect on auditors' propensity to
issue MAOs using the propensity score-matched sample. The coefficient on BigN is
still insignificant. It suggests that the type of the international auditor does not
significantly affect domestic auditors' propensity to issue MAOs.

To summarize, no significant evidence is found that hiring a Big N international
auditor significantly affects the probability that the audit opinions of A-share
financial reports are modified.

6.3 Multivariate Analysis--- Earnings Response Coefficients (ERC)
6.3.1 Dual Audit Effect---Heckman Two-stage Model
Table 7 Panel A reports the results of the first-stage estimation. The results are
similar to those in Table 3 Panel A: company size, turnover, leverage level as well as
reporting of loss are positively associated with the probability of having both A and
B (or H) shares listed. The coefficients on ROE, CASH and Concurrent turn out to
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be significant.
Table 7 Panel B reports the results of the Heckman two-stage regressions for the
dual audit effect with audit quality being measured by earnings response coefficient.
y 3, the coefficient on the interaction term !J.E* DAUL which is my main interest is

positive and marginally significant at 10% level. This is consistent with my
expectation in the hypothesis that dual audit improves A-share audit quality. In this
case, it is reflected in investors' more active response to earning changes. The
positive coefficient suggests that dual audit has an incremental effect on earnings
informativeness. y 1 is, as predicted, positive and significant. Consistent with prior
studies, I find that the market reacts more actively to earning changes in smaller
firms and with higher percentage of shares held by management and higher book
value of equity. STDR which indicates additional risk to investors is negatively
associated with the dependent variable CAR.
(Insert Table 7 here)
6.3.2 Dual Audit Effect--- Propensity Score Matching
The t test of each firm characteristics in the selection equation is reported in Table 8
Panel A. According to the univariate t test, no significant difference in the mean
value of the variables is observed except Concurrent, indicating that the two groups
of firms (pure A share firms and AB/H share firms with non-Big N domestic and
non-Big N international auditors) in the matched subsample have similar
characteristics. I have 266 propensity-matched pairs in the subsample. Table 8 Panel
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B shows the results of the ERC regression for dual audit effect using the matched
sample. The coefficient on !J.E is still positive but not significant. The incremental
effect of dual audit in this case is positive and significant at 1% level. It indicates
that dual audit significantly improves the earnings response coefficient. Regarding
the control variable, STDR is negatively and significantly associated with CAR. It's
consistent with prior studies that investors react less actively to earnings changes in
firms with higher risk.
(Insert Table 8 here)
To summarize, I have evidence that investors are more responsive to earning
changes in firms with dual audit compared to pure A share firms which are only
audited by domestic auditors when I use both the Heckman two-stage procedure and
propensity score matching method to control the potential self-selection bias.
6.3.3 Contagious Effect---Heckman Two-Stage Model
The first-stage selection results are shown in Table 9 Panel A, which are similar to
those in Table 5 Panel A. SIZE, LEV are found to have significant impact on AB/H
share firms' choice to hire Big N international auditors. Table 9 Panel B shows the
results of the second stage regression. 03, which represents the incremental effect of
having Big N international auditors on the earning response coefficient, is positive
with 10% significance. It provides evidence that the market perceives the earnings
of firms hiring Big N internatio:nal auditors more credible. !J.E is positively and
significantly associated with the dependent variable as found in prior studies.
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(Insert Table 9 here)
6.3.4 Contagious Effect---Propensity Score Matching
Table 10 Panel A reports the t test results of each firm characteristics, no significant
difference between the two groups of sample firms hiring Big N versus non-Big N
international auditors is observed. It indicates that I have successfully balanced the
covariates between the treated subsamples, which consist of AB/H share firms
which hire Big N international auditors and the matched control subsample. I obtain
72 pair firm-year observations. Table 10 Panel B shows the results of ERC
regression with the matched subsample. Coefficient on the interaction term !1E*
BigN is positive and significant at 5% level. Hypothesis 2 is supported that Big N

international auditors have spillover effect on the work of domestic auditors and
improves the A share audit quality as a consequence. 15 1, coefficient of 11 E is
insignificant in this setting.
(Insert Table 10 here)
In sum, Big N international auditors are shown to have contagious effect on the
work of domestic auditors and improvement in A-share audit quality provides one
such evidence. I draw implication about the audit quality from market's
responsiveness to firm's earnings information. Both the Heckman two-stage and
propensity score-matching model demonstrate an incremental effect of Big N
international auditors on earnings ;response coefficient.
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Table 11 summarizes the results of the main tests. Hypothesis 1. which predicts that
dual audit improves A-share audit quality is supported when audit quality measured
by auditors' propensity to issue MAOs and earnings response coefficient (regression
#1,2,5 and 6 in Table 11). Mixed evidences are generated for hypothesis 2. Big N
international auditors are found to have contagious effect on the work of domestic
auditors when earnings response coefficient is used to measure the quality of
domestic auditors' work (regression #7 and 8). However, no significant impact of
Big N international auditors on the A-share audit quality can be documented when
audit quality is measured by probability of receiving MAOs (regression# 3 and 4).
It implies that Big N international auditors play an important role in constraining

earnings management and improving the earnings quality and investors perceive the
earnings information of firms with Big N international auditors to be more credible
and response more actively to the earning changes in such firms as a consequence.
However, the contagious effect from Big N international auditor does not seem to
affect domestic auditors' behavior in modifying their audit opinions probably due to
other political or economic factors that affect the audit opinions of domestic
auditors.
(Insert Table 11 here)

6.4 Sensitivity Tests
I perform several sensitivity tests to check the robustness of the findings. The details
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of these tests are discussed in the followed sections.
6.4.1 Alternative Definition of MAO
Dependent variable MAO is a dummy variable classified as either clean or modified
audit opinion. This classification may raise concern that the results may be
inaccurate as different types of audit opinions reflect different level of seriousness of
problems in the financial statement. The second sensitivity test is used to address
such concern. 10 I use a new dependent variable MAO_N which is an ordered-level
variable, which is coded from 0 to 4 for standard unqualified, unqualified with
explanatory notes, qualified, disclaimed and adverse opinions, respectively. Then I
use the ordered-probit regression to rerun prior regressions. The results are
qualitatively similar as in the main tests as shown in Table 12 Panel B. In the dual
audit testing, DUAL is positive and significant at 10% level using Heckman twostage and significant at 1% level with propensity score-matching method when
MAO is used to measure audit quality. For the contagious effect, hiring a Big N
international auditor is not found to significantly affect the A-share audit quality.
(Insert Table 12 here)
6.4.2 Alternative Definition of CAR
In ERC test above, CAR is measured using the estimated market model parameters
a and

~-

In the sensitivity test, I assume the market model beta is unity for sample

10

I also perform another sensitivity test by reclassifying the "unqualified opinion with emphasis of
matter paragraph" audit opinion as cleari to rerun the MAO regressions. Neither dual audit nor hiring
a Big N international auditor has significant impact on the dependent variable MAO due to the highly
unbalanced sample. More than 65% of the modified audit opinions in the main tests are "unqualified
opinion with emphasis of matter paragraph" audit opinion.
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firms and calculate the weekly abnormal return by subtracting the market return
from each firm's weekly stock return without cash dividend reinvested (see equation
(8) below) (Teoh and Wong, 1993). Then I cumulate the weekly abnormal return
beginning with the fifth month to get the new cumulative abnormal return, CAR2,
after the fiscal year-end of t-1 and ending four months after the fiscal year-end to
enable investors to incorporate the annual earnings information. Here, I use the
simpler measure of CAR by adopting the unity beta assumption to avoid introducing
unnecessary noise which could rise if stock beta estimated from market model is
used in the equation. Prior studies suggest that the market model with the beta
estimated from the market model may not be applicable in Chinese market in
explaining the risk and return relationship, due to relatively low market efficiency
and less educated investors (Jin and Liu, 2001; Li, 2009).
CAR2=l; log(! +Rit-Rmt)

(8)

Table 12 Panel B reports the results of dual audit effect and contagious effect on
ERC based on CAR2 instead of CAR in the main tests. As can be observed from the
Table (Panel B), both dual audit and hiring a Big N international auditor have
positive and significant effect on earnings responsiveness when Heckman two-stage
model is used to address the potential self-selection problem. Contagious effect is
also supported by propensity score matching method. However, no significant
evidence about dual audit effect is provided if propensity score matching method is
used. My results are robust to alternative measurement of CAR.
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6.4.3 Mandatory Dual Audit Only
My samples in the main tests contain both mandatory and voluntary dual audit in the
sample period from 2001 to 2012. To respond to the concern that there may be some
unobservable factors that influence a firm's decision to continue to have dual audit
voluntarily, which may be biased in favour of the conclusion drawn from the main
tests. To address such concern, I exclude the firm-year observations with voluntary
dual audit in the sample and rerun the regressions. This means that AB share firmyear observations which still have dual audit in the fiscal year end 2007 and
afterwards and AH share firm-year observations that have dual audit from 2010 to
2012 will be excluded in this sensitivity test. The results are as shown in Table 12
Panel C. The results are similar to the main test results. However, the dual audit
effect and contagious effect on ERC based on propensity score matching turn out to
be insignificant. The test of contagious effect based on MAO using PSM method is
not feasible due to sample size limitation. The results suggest that the conclusion
drawn earlier in the-main tests regarding the dual audit effect and contagious effect
is robust when voluntary dual audits are excluded from the sample.
6.4.4 Include AB Share Dual Audit Only
Despite that both AB share firms and AH share firm are subject to dual audit in
China, there may be concern that international auditors hired by these two kinds of
firms are with different characteri.stics. For example, although many AB share firms
hire CPA firms in Hong Kong as their international auditors, CPA firms' audit work
57

for AH share firms are subject to the scrutiny of Hong Kong Stock Exchange and
HKSFC while AB share audits are not. To respond to the concern the potential
different characteristics of AB share firms and AH share firms' international auditors
may make the conclusion drawn about the dual audit and contagious effect
inaccurate, I use subsamples with AH share firm-year observations excluded. Table
12 Panel D shows the results. Dual audit effect on probability of receiving MAOs is
still significant. No significant evidence of contagious effect on audit opinion is
found. Both dual audit effect and contagious effect on earnings responsiveness are
supported when Heckman two-stage selection model is used. The coefficient on the
interaction terms (liE* DUAL and liE* BigN ) tum out to be insignificant using
propensity score matching method.
6.4.5 Pre- and Post-abolishment Comparison
Another approach to assess the dual audit effect is to compare pre- and postabolishment audit quality to test whether the abolishment of dual audit requirement
compromises the audit quality of AB/H share firmsY I compare the-audit quality of
A-share financial statements of AB share firms in the pre-abolishment period (with
dual audit) with the audit quality post-abolishment period (without dual audit). In
this comparison, voluntary dual audits after the abolishment are not included. Table
12 Panel E shows the test results. POST is a dummy variable that takes the value of

11

The dual audit requirement for AH share firms is abolished in 2010. However, most AH share firms
in my sample do have dual audit in the post-abolishment period (from 2010 to2012) on a voluntary
basis. As a result, AH share firm observations are excluded from the comparison.
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1 if the fiscal year is in the post-abolishment period and 0 if the fiscal year is in the
pre-abolishment period. As shown in the table, the coefficient of POST is negative
and significant, suggesting that AB share firms are less likely to receive MAOs in
the post-abolishment period compared with the pre-abolishment period. However,
no significant difference in earnings responsiveness is found between those two
periods.

Lin eta!. (2014) also examine the impact of dual audit on A-share audit quality. My
thesis is different from their study in terms of measures of audit quality, selfselection methods used, effects tested as well as my focus on non-Big N audit
quality and sample period used. They use discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit
quality and they only use Heckman two-stage model to address the potential selfselection problem. Two measures of audit quality are adopted in this thesis, MAO
and ERC, representing both Accounting-Auditing based and market-based measures.
As discretionary accruals tend to have high measurementerror and there is a lack of
consensus on how it should be measured, I believe I use better measures of audit
quality. In addition, I use both Heckman two-stage and PSM methods to solve the
self-selection problem. As these two methods have their own merits in addressing
self-selection bias, my thesis provides more comprehensive evidence in assessing
the real effect of dual, audits on audit quality. My thesis separates the dual audit
effect and contagious effect while these two effects were confounded with by Lin et
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al.(2014). I focus on the audit quality of non-Big N auditors which is of greater
concern and academic interest. My thesis utilizes the most updated data including
both mandatory and voluntary dual audits. My sample period is from 2001 to 2012
as opposed to 2001 to 2009 in Lin et al.(2014).
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Chapter 7 Conclusion

This thesis· examines the dual audit effect and the contagious effect on the audit
quality of A-share financial statements. The unique setting in the Chinese market
that pure A share firms only need to be audited by domestic auditors while AB/H
share firms are subject to dual audit by both domestic and international auditors
makes it possible to test the impact of dual audit and contagious effect of Big N
international auditors on audit quality by comparing the quality of services provided
by domestic auditors. The test results reveal consistent superior audit quality in
AB/H share firms that are subject to dual audit and hire non-Big N domestic and
non-Big N international auditors, as compared with those pure A share firms which
are only audited once by their domestic auditors. However, mixed evidences are
documented regarding the contagious effect of Big N international auditors on the
audit quality of A-share financial reports when different measures of audit quality
are used. Hiring a Big N CPA firm as an international auditor is found to improve
investors' responsiveness but no significant influence on the audit opinion issued by
auditors.
This study contributes to the literature of audit quality, particularly the literature on
audit quality of non-Big N auditors in emerging markets. Audit quality of non-Big N
auditors in emerging markets with relative weak institutional environment is of great
concern and attracts increasing research interests. My findings provide new evidence
on the factors that affect the audit quality of non-Big N auditors in China.
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This study has important implications for regulatory bodies in China by providing
empirical evidence on the dual audit effect and contagious effect in the dual audit
setting and consequently on ways to improve audit quality in Chinese market.
Regulatory bodies, especially the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(CICPA) and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), emphasize the
importance of auditors' service quality and have made persistent efforts to explore
ways to improve audit quality. As this study shows that being dual audited and
hiring Big N international auditors are associated with higher audit quality,
regulatory bodies could consider such effects in making new regulations and rules.
My thesis has important policy implications for the Ministry of Finance in China
which issued the Provisional Regulations on Cross-border Audit Services of CPA
Firms (consultative draft) in May 2014. 12 According to the draft, non-PRC CPA
firms are not allowed to supply audit services to Chinese enterprises listed overseas.
It also specifically precludes non-PRC CPA firms' audit services to enterprises
registered overseas but with operating entities in China. My research results indicate
that dual audit does improve the audit quality supplied by domestic auditors, as
established international auditors provide effective pressure on the domestic auditors
to maintain higher audit quality. 13 Thus, the restriction of non-PRC CPA firms' audit
services to Chinese companies may make it more difficult to improve audit quality
12

See footnote I.
Particularly, Hong Kong auditors play very important roles in providing peer pressure to domestic
auditors. Hong Kong auditors are familiar with the Chinese business environment (70% to 80% of
international auditors in dual audit effect tests are Hong Kong CPA firms) and are subject to a more
established and stronger institutional environment.
13
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in China. This is an important implication of my research.
There are also implications for regulatory bodies in other emerging markets. Many
emerging markets are exploring ways to improve the institutional environment in
their markets in order to attract worldwide investment. As audit quality is an
important factor in assessing the institutional environment of a country, policy
makers in these markets should consider the dual audit effect and contagious effect
of Big N international auditors when making their policies to 1mprove audit quality
and enhance the institutional environment.
There are additional implications from this research. The mandatory dual audit
requirement for AB-share and AH-share firms is abolished from 2007 and 2010
fiscal year end, respectively. Dual audit is adopted by firms only on a voluntary
basis after the abolishment. My findings suggest that management could continue to
have dual audit as it can enhance the credibility of the financial statements. For
example, when a firm plans to have rights issue, management should be inclined to
improve financial reports credibility to ensure market's responsiveness to the rights
issue. This study provides management an alternative to improve the credibility of
the financial reports and information transparency.
I acknowledge several limitations on this study. First, I only used MAO and ERC to
measure the audit quality of A-share financial statements. MAO measures auditors'
propensity to modify audit opinions. Audit opinions are the final product of audit
services and are tmder auditors' control. Thus, it is a direct measure of audit quality.
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Unlike MAO which is an Accounting-Auditing based measure, ERC is a marketbased measure of audit quality. The thesis is that if the audit quality is high, the
audited earnings should have a high impact on share value. Thus, ERC provides an
additional evidence of audit quality in light of dual audit and contagious effects on
audit quality. Prior literature also employs other measures as proxies for audit
quality related to material misstatements and earnings quality, among which
restatements of financial statements and discretionary accruals by management are
more widely used in the literature. Restatements are the corrections of material
misstatements in previous financial statements. Restatements indicate that auditors
did not detect or fail to report some important issues which may affect their audit
opinions. However, not all material misstatements could be detected and generally
auditors and companies are reluctant to restate their financial statements.
Furthermore, using restatements as proxies for audit quality could aggravate the
sample size problem in my research setting especially in the contagious effect tests.
As for the use of discretionary accruals as

a measure of audit quality, Dkis known

to have larger measurement error (Defond & Zhang, 2013). There is also a lack of
consensus on how it should be measured. It is also affected by the different
accounting methods chosen within GAAP.
Second, the tests in this thesis, especially the contagious effect tests, are subject to
the sample size limitation. As observed in the sensitivity tests, some tests are even
not feasible due to the small sample size. Third, I do not have sufficient observations
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to have pre- and post-abolishment comparison of AH share firms' audit quality
because the dual audit requirement for AH share companies is not abolished until
2010. For future research, dual audit effect as well as the influence of the
abolishment may be tested when more data is available in the future.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A Dependent variable
Dependent Variable ---MAO
Pure A

AB/H

AB/H

Test of Mean Difference

Non-BigN

BigN

P-Value

(I)

(2)

(3)

(I) vs (2)

(2)

Mean

0.061

0.157

0.099

0.0000**

0.0790*

S.D.

0.239

0.364

0.299

Number of Obs

13,540

287

172

VS

(3)

Notes: MAO is coded one if the sample firm-year receives a modified audit opinion in the firm's A-share financial statements, and zero otherwise. Modified
audit opinions include unqualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph, qualified, disclaimer and adverse audit opinions.
Pure A donates firms that only issue A shares and have non-Big N domestic auditors.
AB/H (Non-BigN) are firms that issue both A shares and B (or H) shares and hire non-Big N domestic auditors and non-Big N international auditors.
AB/H (BigN) are firms that issue both A shares and B (or H) shares and hire non-Big N domestic auditors and Big N international auditors.
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Table 1 (continued)
Panel B Independent Variables
Pure A
(1)

Variables
Mean

AB/H (non-BigN)
(2)
S.D.

21.3850
1.0610
SIZE
LEV
0.4866
0.1956
0.5503
TURN
0.6713
0.1117
0.3151
LOSS
0.0195
1.7954
ROE
ARlNV
0.2820
0.1765
4.5637
AGE
7.7684
0.3302
0.0970
Indep
0.8540
0.3532
Concurrent
0.2162
EXE
0.0440
0.4820
SOE
0.6031
0.0826
0.6691
RET
0.0787
STDR
0.0515
0.1267
0.3326
FORM
Big!O
0.2231
0.4164
SWITCH
0.0970
0.2960
Industry
0.5583
0.4966
Notes: *,** and *** denote significance at 0.1 0, 0.05

Mean

AB/H(BigN)
(3)

S.D.

Pvalue

21.7316
0.5754
0.8084
0.2091
-0.0431
0.3076
10.7282
0.3148
0.8502
0.0021
0.8084
-0.0792
0.0478
0.1707
0.4669
0.2509
0.5436

Diff. Mean
(1 )-(2)

S.D.

1.4154
22.1771
1.2379
-0.3466***
0.1760
0.4919
0.1911
-0.0888***
0.9945
0.6352
0.5188
-0.1371 ***
0.4073
0.1860
0.3903
-0.0970***
0.4871
-0.0575
0.9582
0.0625
0.1690
0.2800
0.1863
-0.0256**
-2.9600***
3.228
8.2733
3.6259
0.1109
0.3023
0.1205
0.0154***
0.3575
0.8663
0.3413
0.8575
0.0197
0.0008
0.0032
0.0419***
0.3943
0.8488
0.3593
0.0000***
0.4201
0.0360
0.7083
0.1619***
0.0264
0.0399
0.0219
0.0036
0.3769
0.0349
0.1840
-0.0441 **
0.5000
0.2326
0.4237
-0.2438***
0.4343
0.0698
0.2555
-0.1538***
0.5814
0.4948
0.4990
0.0147
and 0.001 levels, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix I.
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Diff.Mean
(2)-(3)

-0.4464***
0.0839***
0.1729**
0.0230
0.0146
0.0278
2.4201 ***
0.0111
-0.0161
0.0013
-0.0405
-0.1156**
0.0078**
0.1358***
0.2378***
0.1846***
-0.038

Table 2 Correlation Matrix
MAO
MAO
DUAL
SIZE
LEV
LOSS
ROE

DUAL

SIZE

LEV

LOSS

ROE

TURN

ARINV

In:lep

Concturent

AGE

SOE

EXE

RET

SIDR

BiglO

FORM SWITCH In:lrntry

1.000
0308 ...
0.025 ...
0.029 ...

1.000
0.013 1.000
0.004 -0.022 ... 1.000

1.000
0.056 '** 1.000
-0.160 '** 0.047 '*' 1.000
0.169 '** 0.065 *** 0.280 ... 1.000
0.325 *'* 0.044 *** -0.139 ... 0.199 '** 1.000

0.018 **
TURN
0.101 **'
ARINV
-0.035 '"
0.143 ***
Indep
0.072 ...
ConctureLrt -0.007
-0.002
0.047 ... 0.093 ... 0.195 ...
AGE
SOE
·0.032 *** 0.060 ... 0.203 '"
EXE
-0.035 "' -0.028 *'* 0.015 *
-0.077 '"
-0.087 ***
0.029 ***
-0.074 ***

·0.005
0,035 ***
0.021 ..
·0.023 ...

-0.060 ***
0.087 ***
0.255 ***
0.048 ...
0.048 ...
0.261 ...

-0.159 *** 1.000
-0.101 ... 0.023 ***
0.035 *** -0.019..
-0.032 ... 0.009
-0.001
-0.016.
0.064 "' 0.005

1.000
0.060 *** 1.000
0.072 '" -0.020 .. 1.000
0.026 ... -0.062 ... -0.053 ... 1.000

0.040 *'* 0.00 I
0.231 *'*
-O.Oll
0.040 *'* -0.089 ... -0.125 ***
0.111 ... 0.004
-0.106 ... -0.046 ... 0.009 -0.006
0.053 "* 0.077 ***
RET
-0.039 *'* -0.035 *** 0.052 "' 0.032 *** -0.085 ... 0.040 *** 0.034 *** -0.020 .. 0.044 ...
0.017*' 0.089 "'
0.012
O.Oll
SIDR
-0.028 '** 0.057 *" 0.010
0.016 * -0.007
BiglO
0.059 *** 0.016.
-0.030 '** 0.071 "' 0.160 ... 0.002
-0.029 *** 0.004
0.100 ***
0.019 .. 0.057 *** -0.002
0.002
-0.003 -0.021 .. 0.040 ... 0.045 ***
FORM
-O.Oll
SWITCH 0.072 *** 0.073 *** -0.025 *** 0.046 *** 0.047 ... -0.012 -0.035 *** 0.024 *** -0.078 ***
0.063 ... 0.007
-0.005
Indrntry -0.040 ... -0.004
0.025 ...
·O.o38 *** -0.086 *** 0.004

0.063 *** 1.000
0.159 '** 0.105 ...

1.000

-0.097 *** -0.215"' -0.234 *'* 1.000
0.006
0.067 ... -0.014
-0.008
0.003
-0.008
-0.035 ***
O.Oll
-0.032 ***

0,078 '" -0.042 *** -0.008

0.483 "'
0.050 "' -0.012
0.077 "' 0.023 '**
0,025 ... -0.074 *** 0.061 ... -0.037 ***
0.000
0.035 ... -0.025 *'* 0.008
-0.157 ... -0.071 **' 0.052 '" 0.007

Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests).
This correlation matrix is based on Pearson correlation.
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1.000
1.000
0.004
-0.016.
0.021 "
-0.010

Table 3 Dual Audit Effect on MAO Based on Heckman Two-Stage Method
Panel A First-Stage Results
Stage one: probit estimation of firms choosing to have both A shares and B (or H)
shares listed

DUAL= J.lo+ J.li Sales_growth + J.1.2SIZE+ J.l3LEV+ J.l4 TURN+ J.lsROE+ J.l6LOSS
+ J.1.1ARINV+ J.lsCASH + J.1.9Indep + J.lioConcurrent+ J.lnEXE
+ J.1.12 Industry + J.li Year + e

P>lzl

Variables

Coefficients

Constant
Sales Growth
SIZE
TURN
ROE
ARINV
LEV
LOSS
CASH
Indep
Concurrent
EXE
Industry
YEAR
pseudo R-sq
Number of Obs

-6.431
0.000***
-0.011
0.504
0.000***
0.203
0.149
0.000***
0.026
0.400
0.574
0.088
0.602
0.000***
0.000***
0.328
-0.438
0.126
0.006***
1.110
-0.116
0.125
-2.108
0.056*
0.042
0.422
Included, but not reported for brevity
9.74%
13,033

Notes: This table shows the results of the first-stage probit regression, estimating th<

probability of a firm choosing to have either pure A shares or both A and B (or H) share:
listed. All variables are as defined in Appendix 1.
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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Table 3 (continued)
Panel B Second-Stage Results
MAO= ao+ UtDUAL +2:ai Control Variables +s
Variables
Constant
DUAL
SIZE
LEV
LOSS
ROE
TURN
ARINV
Indep
Concurrent
EXE
AGE
SOE
RET
STDR
FORM
Big10
SWITCH
Lambda
Industry
YEAR
N
pseudo R-sq

Expected
Si

+
?

+
+
+
?
?
?

+
+
+
?

Coefficients

!-statistic

6.47
3.779
0.284
2.49
-0.276
-10.57
11.29
1.587
0.923
17.91
..].20
-0.015
-0.254
-3.86
-0.187
-1.63
-0.15
-0.055
-0.034
-0.57
0.29
0.065
0.037
5.93
-0.137
-3.03
-1.72
-0.085
0.622
2.30
-2.22
-0.154
1.62
0.085
0.257
4.38
-0.041
-0.75
-1.81
-0.076
Included, but not reported for brevity
12,885
25.36%

P>izl
0.000***
0.013**
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.230
0.000***
0.104
0.883
0.567
0.771
0.000***
0.002***
0.085*
0.022**
0.027**
0.106
0.000***
0.452
0.070*

Notes: This table shows the second stage estimation results of the impact of being dual
audited by both non-Big N domestic and non-Big N international auditors on auditors'
propensity to issue MAOs. The dependent variable is Modified Audit Opinion (MAO) as
defined in Appendix I. All other variables are as defined in Appendix I.
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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Table 4 Dual Audit Effect on MAO under PSM Model
Panel A

Mean Test of Firm Characteristics

Firm characteristics (Pure A share vs. AB/H share firms) for the propensity
matched-pair subsample
DUAL= J.to+ 111 Sales_growth + 112SIZE+ Jl3LEV + 14 TURN+ J.tsROE+ Jl6LOSS
+ J.t7ARINV + J.tsCASH + Jl9lndep + J.t10Concurrent+ J.tuEXE + a

Firm
Characteristics
Sales Growth

Pure A share firm

ABIH share firm

Test of Mean
. Diff.

Mean

Mean

P-Value

0.2457

0.2723

0.771

21.6717

21.7300

0.583

0.7701

0.7427

0.627

-0.0506

-0.0365

0.775

ARINV

0.3114

0.3073

0.783

LEV

0.5695

0.5737

0.782

LOSS

0.2021

0.2128

0.689

CASH

0.1342

0.1337

0.958

Indep-

0.3117

0.3147

0.752

Concurrent

0.8617

0.8511

0.719

EXE

0.0013

0.0022

0.522 .

SIZE
TURN
ROE

N

282

282

Notes: This table shows the univariate t test of each firm characteristics used in the selection
equation to match the control and treatment group partitioned by whether a firm has both A
share and B (or H) share listed. As shown in the t test of mean differences between the..two
groups, there is no difference in firm characteristics between pure A share firms and AB/H
share firms with Non-Big4 domestic and Non-Big N international auditors. Variables are as
defined in Appendix 1.
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Table 4 (Continued)
Panel B Regression Results with Matched Subsample
MAO= ao+ UtDUAL +Iuj Control Variables +s
Variables
Constant
DUAL
SIZE
LEV
LOSS
ROE
TURN
ARINV
AGE
lndep
Concurrent
EXE
SOE
RET
STDR
FORM
Big10
SWITCH
Industry
YEAR
N
pseudo R-sq

Expected Sign

+
?
+
+

+
?
?
?

+
+
+
?

Coefficients

t-statistic

-0.773
-0.42
0.744
3.10
-0.114
-1.30
2.224
3.84
0.197
0.85
-0.683
-3.26
-0.207
-1.15
1.149
2.30
-0.057
-1.54
-0.078
-0.06
0.612
1.86
-116.428
-1.20
-0.481
-2.30
-0.294
-1.14
3.819
1.10
0.094
0.38
0.279
1.46
0.120
0.63
1.18
0.195
Included, but not reported for brevity
564
34.02%

P>lzl
0.677
0.002***
0.193
0.000***
0.395
0.001 ***
0.250
0.021 **
0.123
0.949
0.063*
0.229
0.021 **
0.255
0.272
0.706
0.144
0.526
0.239

Notes: This table shows the results of the pro bit estimation of auditors' propensity to issue
MAOs based on the propensity matched subsample. The sample consists of 282 AB/H share
firms with non-Big N domestic and non-Big N international auditors and their pure A share
matches with non-Big N domestic auditors. All variables are as defined in Appendix. I.
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and O.OOllevels, respectively.
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Table 5 Contagious Effect on MAO based on Heckman Two-Stage Model
Panel A First-Stage Results
Stage one: probit estimation of AB/H firms choosing to hire Big N
international auditors
BigN= A.o+ A.1SIZE+ A-2 TURN+ A3LEV+ "-4Curr+ A.sLOSSt-1 + A.6ROA+ A-7 lndep
+A.sConcurrent + ~EXE + A.wRightst+1 + A.uMAOt-1
+ A12 Industry+ AiYear+ £
Variables
Constant
SIZE
LEV
TURN
Curr
ROA
LOSSt-1
lndep
Concurrent
EXE
RightSt+1
MAOt-1
Industry
YEAR
N
pseudo R-sq

Coefficients

P>Jzl

-7.638
0.000***
0.359
0.000***
-1.576
0.000***
-0.341
0.011 **
0.882
0.017**
0.564
0.543
0.020
0.915
1.142
0.213
0.186
0.329
-6.135
0.387
0.566
0.231
-0.224
0.282
0.329
0.131
Included, but not reported for brevity
459
14.65%

Notes: This table shows the results of the first-stage pro bit estimation of the probability that
a firm chooses to hire Big N CPA firm as international auditor. The dependent variable,
BigN, is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if an AB/H firm has a Big N international
auditor and 0 if its international auditor is a Non-Big N CPA firm. All other variables are as
defined in Appendix 1.
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001levels, respectively.
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Table 5 (Continued)
PanelB . Second-Stage Results
MAO= Po+ PtBigN +IPj Control Variables +s
Variables

Expected Sign

Coefficients

t-statistic

P>lzl

Constant
-24.435
-3.60
0.000***
BigN
+
-0.055
-0.24
0.812
0.001 ***
?
0.913
3.18
SIZE
LEV
+
-2.681
-2.01
0.045**
LOSS
+
0.151
0.59
0.555
ROE
-0.531
-1.94
0.052*
0.000***
-4.38
TURN
-1.157
ARINV
+
4.301
4.99
0.000***
0.017**
AGE
-0.141
-2.39
?
0.001 ***
3.24
Concurrent
?
1.387
0.000***
-30.109
-3.59
EXE
0.095*
-1.67
-0.401
SOE
0.047
0.16
0.876
RET
+
0.44
0.660
STDR
1.590
0.133
+
0.535
1.50
FORM
0.388
Big10
+
0.191
0.86
0.240
SWITCH
0.282
1.18
?
0.000***
Lambda
4.057
4.19
0.000***
Industry
0.850
3.56
Included, but not reported for brevity
YEAR
435
N
42.04%
pseudo R-sq
Notes: This table shows the results of second stage probit estimation regression for the test
of contagious effect of Big N international auditors on the A-share audit quality. The
dependent variable is MAO as defined in Appendix 1. Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio
estimated from the stage one probit estimation. All independent variables are as defined in
Appendix 1.
Variable Indep is omitted from this regression due to its high correlation with one year
dummy.
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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Table 6 Contagious Effect on MAO Based on PSM Model
Panel A Mean Difference Test of Firm Characteristics

Firm Characteristics Partitioned by the international auditor type for the
propensity matched-pair subsarnple
BigN= J.o+ A.1SIZE+ A.2 TURN+ A.3LEV+ ""Curr+ A.sLOSS 1.1 + A.6ROA+ /..1 Indep
+A.gConcurrent + "-9EXE + A.10Rights1+1 + A.IIMA01.J+ e
Pure A share firm

AB/H share firm

Test of Mean Diff.

Firm
P-Value
Mean
Mean
Characteristics
22.1746
0.713
SIZE
22.0972
LEV
0.5221
0.5238
0.543
0.6471
0.6895
0.947
TURN
0.727
Curr
0.4894
0.5008
0.0294
ROA
0.0222
0.410
0.1446
0.1566
0.830
LOSS 1.1
0.3205
0.471
Indep
0.3087
0.468
Concurrent
0.9036
0.8675
0.0002
0.0009
0.148
EXE
0.0120
1.000
0.0120
RightSt+l
0.468
0.1325
0.0964
MA0 1.1
83
N
83
Notes: This table shows the univariate t test of each firm characteristic specified in the
equation to match the control and treatment group partitioned by whether an AB/H share
firm hire Big N international auditor or hire non-Big N international auditor. As shown in
the t test of mean differences between the two groups, there is no difference in firm
characteristics between AB/H share firms with non-Big N domestic and non-Big N
international auditors and AB/H share firms with non-Big N domestic and Big N
international auditors in the matched subsample.
All variables are as defined in Appendix I.
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Table 6 (Continued)
Panel B Regression Results with Matched Subsample
MAO= ~o+ ~1BigN +L~j Control Variables +e
Variables

Expected Sign

Coefficients

t-statistic

P>lzl

Constant
-6.819
-1.02
0.308
BigN
-0.798
-1.41
0.157
+
SIZE
?
0.228
0.76
0.447
LEV
-0.562
-0.30
0.767
+
LOSS
-0.855
-1.34
0.180
+
ROE
-0.537
-2.56
0.011 **
TURN
-0.003
-0.01
0.992
ARINV
6.447
4.42
0.000***
+
AGE
?
-0.045
-0.45
0.653
Concurrent
?
0.596
0.82
0.410
EXE
-338.538
-0.48
0.631
SOE
-0.870
-1.52
0.127
RET
-1.401
-1.02
0.306
STDR
0.921
1.372
0.10
+
FORM
0.850
0.92
0.358
+
0.453
0.88
0.379
Big10
+
?
0.511
0.85
0.395
SWITCH
Industry
-0.512
-1.22
0.221
YEAR
Included, but not reported for brevity
N
166
45.19%
pseudo Rsq
Notes: This table shows the results of contagious effect on auditors' propensity to issm
MAOs based on the propensity-matched subsample. The subsample consists of 83 AB/f
share firms with non-Big N domestic auditor and Big N international auditor and their AB/f
share matches which hire non-Big N domestic auditors and non-Big N international auditor:
The dependent variable is MAO. All variables are as defined in Appendix 1.
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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Table 7 Dual Audit Effect on ERC Based on Heckman Two-Stage Method
Panel A First-Stage Results
Stage one: pro bit estimation of firms choosing to have both A shares and B (or H)
shares listed
DUAL= ~o+ ~~ Sales_growth + ~2SIZE+ ~3LEV+ ~4 TURN+ ~sROE+
+ ~7ARINV+ ~sCASH + ~9Indep + ~10Concurrent+ ~uEXE
+ ~12 Industry+ ~i Year+ E
Variables

Coefficients

~6LOSS

P>lzl

-7.346
0.000***
Constant
-0.010
0.394
Sales Growth
0.000***
0.253
SIZE
0.206
0.000***
TURN
-0.977
0.054*
ROE
ARINV
0.175
0.276
0.358
0.048**
LEV
0.166
0.099*
LOSS
-0.497
0.096*
CASH
0.014**
1.022
Indep
0.039**
-0.158
Concurrent
-1.911
0.070*
EXE
0.542
0.033
Industry
Included, but not reported for brevity
YEAR
10.76%
pseudo R-sq
12,984
Number of Obs
Notes: This table shows the results of the first-stage probit regression, estimating the
probability of a firm choosing to have either pure A shares or both A and B (or H) shares
listed. The variables are as defined in Appendix 1.
*, ** and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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Table 7 (continued)
Second-Stage Results
CAR=yo+y1flE + Y2DUAL+y3flE* DUAL+2)j Control Variables +s
Variables
Constant
tlE
DUAL
flE*DUAL
SIZE
LEV
CURRENT
BV
GROWTH
Indep
Concurrent
EXE
SOE
STDR
FORM
Big10
SWITCH
Lambda
Industry
YEAR
N
Rz
adjusted R2

Expected Sign
+
+
+
?
+
+
+

+
+
+

+
?

Coefficients

t-statistic

P>lzl

2.243
3.84
0.685
6.95
0.038
1.23
0.493
1.79
-0.090
-4.45
0.002
0.03
0.002
1.22
0.019
5.32
0.0003
0.79
-0.079
-0.78
0.017
1.02
0.235
2.04
0.016
1.09
'-7.081
-2.96
-0.005
-0.27
0.011
0.87
0.013
0.69
-0.131
-2.12
1.18
0.014
Included, but not reported for brevity
12,983
10.81%
10.6%

0.000***
0.000***
0.218
0.074*
0.000***
0.975
0.222
0.000***
0.430
0.434
0.310
0.042**
0.277
0.003***
0.785
0.384
0.490
0.034**
0.237

Notes: This table shows the results of the second stage regression for the dual audit effect

on firm's earnings response coefficient. The dependent variable is CAR, cumulative
abnormal return, cumulate the weekly abnormal return from month -8 to month 4, where the
fiscal year end is month 0, calculated as CAR=L log(l +Rica-~Rm1 ). All other variables are
as defined in Appendix 1.
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and O.OOllevels, respectively.
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Table 8 Dual Audit Effect on ERC under PSM Model
Panel A .Mean Test of Firm Characteristics

Firm characteristics (Pure A share vs. AB/H share firms) for the propensity
matched-pair subsample
DUAL= f!O+ !!I Sales_growth + J.LzSIZE+ J!JLEV + 14 TURN+ J.LsROE+ J!6LOSS
+ J.1.1ARINV + J.LsCASH + J!9lndep + J.1.10Concurrent+ !!11EXE + c

Firm
Characteristics
Sales_Growth

Pure A share firm

AB/H share firm

TestofMean
Diff.

Mean

Mean

P-Value

0.1082

0.0924

0.520

21.9023

21.8160

0.457

TURN

0.7870

0.7620

0.674

ROE

0.0138

0.0057

0.235

ARINV

0.3048

0.3130

0.599

LEV

0.5504

0.5701

0.203

LOSS

0.1617

0.1955

0.309

CASH

0.1312

0.1327

0.847

Indep

0.3199

0.3122

0.414

Concurrent

0.7669

0.8421

0.029**

EXE

0.0021

0.0023

0.908

N

266

266

SIZE

Notes: This table shows the univariate t test of each firm characteristics used in the selection
equation to match the control and treatment group partitioned by whether a firm has both A
share and B (or H) shares listed. As shown in the t test of mean differences between the ·two
groups, there is no difference in firm characteristics between pure A share firms and ABIH
share firms with non-Big4 domestic and non-Big N international auditors except Concurrent.
All variables are as defined in Appendix l.
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Table 8 (continued)
Panel B: Regression Results with Matched Subsample
CAR=yo+ytfi.E + y2DUAL+y3 /I.E* DUAL+I;yj Control Variables +s
Variables
Constant
/I.E
DUAL
fi.E*DUAL
SIZE
LEV
CURRENT
BV
GROWTH
Indep
Concurrent
EXE
SOE
STDR
FORM
Big10
SWITCH
Industry
YEAR
N
R2

Expected Sign
+
+
+

?
+
+
+
+
+

+
+

?

Coefficients

t-statistics

P>/z/

1.204
2.27
0.024**
0.044
0.882
0.15
0.050
0.97
0.333
0.005***
1.072
2.80
-0.067
-2.60
0.010**
0.376
2.05
0.041 **
0.021
0.555
0.59
0.013
1.03
0.302
-0.0001
-0.44
0.660
-0.431
-1.01
0.311
0.030
0.51
0.610
0.135
0.876
0.16
0.157
1.42
0.084
-4.320
-1.82
0.069*
0.594
-0.029
-0.53
-0.006
-0.11
0.915
-0.020
-0.39
0.698
-0.046
-1.14
0.254
Included, but not reported for brevity
532
8.77%
3.7%

adjusted R.'Notes: This table shows the results of dual audit on the earning response coefficient based
on the propensity-matched subsample. The subsample consists of 266 AB/H share firms
which hire non-Big N domestic auditor and non-Big N international auditor and their pure A
matches who only hire non-Big N domestic auditor. The dependent variable is CAR,
cumulative abnormal return. Other variables are as defined in Appendix 1.
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and O.OO!levels, respectively.
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Table 9 Contagious Effect on ERC Based on Heckman Two-Stage Model
Panel A First-Stage Results
Stage one: probit estimation of AB/H firms choosing to hire Big N
international auditors
BigN= A.o+ A.1SIZE+ /...2 TURN+ A.3LEV+ A.4Curr+ A.sLOSSt-1 + A.6ROA+ A.7 Indep
+A.sConcurrent + /...gEXE + A.10Rightst+1 + A.11MAOt-1
+ /... 12 Industry+ AiYear+ c
Variables
Constant
SIZE
LEV
TURN
Curr
ROA
LOSSt-1
Indep
Concurrent
EXE
RightSt-1
MAOt-1
Industry
YEAR
N
pseudo R-sq

Coefficients

P>lzl

0.000***
-7.638
0.352
0.000***
0.000***
-1.912
0.037**
-0.271
0.010**
1.020
0.674
0.417
0.967
-0.009
0.318
1.013
0.188
0.273
-8.552
0.506
0.567
0.303
0.162
-0.312
0.535
0.088
Included, but not reported for brevity
423
15.81%

Notes: This table shows the results of the first-stage probit estimation of the probability that
a firm chooses to hire a Big N CPA firm as international auditor. The dependent variable,
BigN, is an indicator variable set equal to I if an AB/H firm has a Big N international
auditor and 0 if its international auditor is a Non-Big N CPA firm. All other variables are as
defined in Appendix 1.
*,** and *** denote significance at 0.1 0, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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Table 9 (continued)
Panel B Second-Stage Regression Results
CAR=oo+od'>E + ozBigN+o3Ll.E* BigN+Z:oj Control Variables +s
Variables
Constant
Ll.E
BigN
Ll.E*BigN
SIZE
LEV
CURRENT
BV
GROWTH
Indep
Concurrent
EXE
SOE
STDR
FORM
Big10
SWITCH
Lambda
Industry
YEAR
N

Rz

Expected Sign
+
+
+

?
+
+

+
+
+

+
+

?

Coefficients

t-statistics

P>[z[

0.181
0.21
0.837
0.419
2.06
0.040**
0.014
0.26
0.796
. 0.077*
0.665
1.77
-0.006
-0.15
0.881
0.():2
0.003
0.987
-0.012
-0.39
0.699
0.21
0.831
0.003
-0.0008
-0.69
0.493
-0.162
-0.56
0.579
-0.008
-0.12
0.906
0.586.
-0.620
-0.54
-0.018
-0.33
0.745
0.912
0.122
0.11
0.612
0.029
0.51
0.429
0.038
0.79
0.847
-0.011
-0.19
0.15
0.880
0.017
-0.017
-0.37
0.711
Included, but not reported for brevity
423
11.45%
4.9%

adjusted R 2
Notes: This table shows the results of second stage regression for test of contagious effect of
Big N international auditors on the A-share audit quality. The dependent variable is CAR as
defined in Appendix I. All independent variables are defined in Appendix I.
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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Table 10 Contagious Effect on ERC Based on PSM Method
Panel A Mean Difference Test of Firm Characteristics
Firm Characteristics Partitioned by the international auditor type for the propensity
matched-pair subsample
BigN= A.o+ A.1SIZE+ A.2 TURN+ A.3LEV+ '-4Curr+ A.sLosst-r+ A.6ROA+ A.1 Indep
+A.sConcurrent + ~EXE + A.wRightst+1 + A.11MAOt-1+ s

AB/H share firm

Pure A share firm

Test of Mean
Diff.

Firm
Mean
Mean
P-Value
Characteristics
22.0817
0.489
SIZE
21.9416
0.936
LEV
0.5342
0.5364
0.325
TURN
0.7112
0.6417
0.149
0.4902
0.5404
Curr
0.255
ROA
0.0161
0.0286
0.667
0.1667
0.1944
LOSSt-1
0.3072
0.695
0.3146
Indep
0.787
0.9028
0.8889
Concurrent
0.789
0.0050
EXE
0.0070
0.652
0.0278
0.0417
RightSt+1
0.617
0.1111
0.1389
MAOt-1
72
N
72
Notes: This table shows the univariate t test of each firm characteristics specified in the
equation to match the control and treatment group partitioned by whether an AB/H share
firm hire international auditor or hire non-Big N international auditor. As shown in the t test
of mean differences between the two groups, there is no difference in firm characteristics
between AB/H share firms with non-Big N domestic and non-Big N international auditors
and AB/H share firms with non-Big N domestic and Big N international auditors in the
matched subsample.
All variables are as defined in Appendix 1.
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Table 10 (continued)
Panel B Regression Results with Matched Subsample
CAR=8o+81~E+~hBigN +83~E*

Variables

Expected Sign

BigN+I8j Control Variables +e

Coefficients

t-statistics

P>lzl

0.14
0.890
Constant
0.176
+
-0.094
-0.14
0.885
1:\E
+
0.842
BigN
0.023
0.20
+
2.01
0.047**
1.483
1:\E*BigN
0.001
0.02
0.981
SIZE
?
-0.019
-0.06
0.955
LEV
1.54
0.127
+
0.164
CURRENT
+
-0.019
-0.75
0.453
BV
GROWTH
-0.001
-0.12
0.907
0.048
0.08
0.938
+
Indep
+
0.960
Concurrent
0.007
0.05
0.207
11.800
1.27
+
EXE
-0.240
-1.98
0.050*
SOE
-2.494
-0.94
0.349
STDR
0.867
0.17
+
FORM
0.027
+
0.679
Big10
0.047
0.41
-0.08
0.938
-0.011
SWITCH
?
0.242
Industry
-0.094
-1.18
Included,
but
not
reported
for
brevity
YEAR
144
N
R2
20.38%
2
1.0%
adjusted R
Notes: This table shows the results of contagious effect on earnings response coefficient
based on the propensity-matched subsample. The subsample consists of 72 AB/H share
firms with non-Big N domestic auditor and Big N international auditor and their AB/H share
matches which hire non-Big N domestic auditor and non-Big N international auditor .. The
dependent variable is CAR. All variables are as defined in Appendix 1.
*,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001levels, respectively
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Table 11 Summary of Results
Results of Main Tests
Reference
Regression #
Table

Dependent
Variable

Selection Method

Effect Tested

Expectation

Empirical Results
Sign

Significance

1

3

MAO

Heckman two-stage

Dual audit

positive

positive

5% level

2

4

MAO

PSM

Dual audit

positive

positive

1% level

3

5

MAO

Heckman two-stage

Contagious

positive

negative

insignificant

4

6

MAO

PSM

Contagious

positive

positive

insignificant

5

7

ERC

Heckman two-stage

Dual audit

positive

positive

10% level

6

8

ERC

PSM

Dual audit

positive

positive

1% level

7

9

ERC

Heckman two-stage

Contagious

positive

positive

10% level

8

10

ERC

PSM

Contagious

positive

positive

5% level
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Table 12 Sensitivity Tests
Panel A Alternative Definition of MAO
Effect Tested

Selection Method

Test variable

Empirical Results
Coefficient

P>lzl

Main test results
Coefficient

P>lzl

Dual audit

Heckman two-stage

DUAL

0.2042

0.057*•

0.284

0.013**

Dual audit

PSM

DUAL

0.6652

0.004***

0.744

0.002***

Contagious

Heckman two-stage

BigN

-0.0258

0.906

-0.055

0.812

Contagious

PSM

BigN

-0.5035

0.352

-0.798

0.157

Panel B

Alternative Measure of CAR---CAR2

Effect Tested

Selection Method

Test variable

Empirical Results
Coefficient

Main test results

P>lzl

Coefficient

P>lzl

t1E*DUAL
t1E*DUAL

0.3181

0.039**

0.493

0.074*

0.1435

0.597

1.072

0.005***

Heckman two-stage

t1E*BigN

0.8648

0.019**

0.665

0.077*

PSM

t1E*BigN

1.2466

0.056*

1.483

0.047**

Dual audit
Dual audit

Heckman two-stage

Contagious
Contagious

PSM
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Table 12 (continued)
Panel C Mandatory dual audit only
Selection Method
Regression Dependent
#
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Panel D
Regression
#
1
2

"

.)

4
5

6
7
8

MAO
MAO
MAO
MAO
ERC
ERC
ERC
ERC

Heckman two~stage
PSM
Heckman two~stage
PSM
Heckman two-stage
PSM
Heckman two-stage
PSM

AB dual audit only
Dependent
Selection Method
Variable
MAO
MAO
MAO
MAO
ERC
ERC
ERC
ERC

Heckman two-stage
PSM
Heckman two-stage
PSM
Heckman two-stage
PSM
Heckman two-stage
PSM

Effect Tested

Expectation

Dual audit
Dual audit
Contagious
Contagious
Dual audit
Dual audit
Contagious
Contagious

positive
positive
positive
positive
positive
positive
positive
positive

Effect Tested

Expectation

Dual audit
Dual audit
Contagious
Contagious
Dual audit
Dual audit
Contagious
Contagious

positive
positive
positive
positive
positive
positive
positive
positive
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Empirical Results
Coeff.
0.3200
0.9739
-0.0055

Sig.
0.007***
0.001 ***
0.981

NIA

NIA

0.5784
0.2306
0.7595
1.0074

0.036**
0.644
0.075*
0.337

Empirical Results
Coeff.
0.2653
0.5865
-0.1478

NIA
0.6822
-0.1813
0.9661
1.1625

Sig.
0.039**
0.050**
0.581
N/A
0.038**
0.840
0.044**
0.360

Main Test Results
Coeff.
0.284
0.744
-0.055
-0.798
0.493
1.072
0.665
1.483

Sig.
0.013**
0.002***
0.812
0.157
0.074*
0.005***
0.077*
0.047**

Main Test Results
Coeff.
0.284
0.744
-0.055
-0.798
0.493
1.072
0.665
1.483

Sig.
0.013**
0.002***
0.812
0.157
0.074*
0.005***
0.077*
0.047**

Table 12 (continued)
Panel E Pre- and Post-Abolishment Period Comparison
Dependent Variable

Independent Variable

Expectation

Coefficient

Pvalue

MAO

POST

Negative

-1.4156

0.014**

ERC

~E*POST

Negative

0.5000

0.234

Notes: 1. MAO represents modified audit opinions and ERC represents earnings response coefficient.
2. Heckman two-stage is Heckman two-stage selection model. PSM is propensity score matching method.
3. N/A means the test is not feasible due to the limitation of sample size.
4. *,**and*** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively
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Figure 1 Research Design for Empirical Results
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Table 12 Panle D
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Appendix 1

Variable Definitions

Variable

Definition

AGE

The number of years a company has been listed

ARINV

Sum of accounts receivable and inventory divided by total
assets at the end of the fiscal year

Big10

Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm's A-share
financial statement is audited by one of the Big10 CPA
firms (based on CICPA annual ranking), otherwise 0

BigN

Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the international auditor
is one ofthe BigN CPA firms, otherwise 0

BV

The book value of equity per share at the end of fiscal year

CAR

The cumulative abnormal return

CASH
Concurrent
Curr
CURRENT
DUAL

The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets at the
end of fiscal year
Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the CEO and board
chairman are different persons, otherwise 0
The ratio of current assets to total assets at the end of fiscal
year
The ratio of current assets to current liabilities at the end of
fiscal year

Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm is audited by
both domestic and international auditors, otherwise 0

EXE

Percentage of shares held by executives

FORM

Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the auditor bears
unlimited liability in audit failure, otherwise 0

Growth

The market-to-book ratio at the end of fiscal year

Indep

Percentage of independent directors on the board

Industry

Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a company is in
manufacturing industry and for a non-manufacturing
company

Lambda

The inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman two-stage model

LEV

The ratio of year-end total liabilities to total assets

LOSS
MAO

Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the net income in the
fiscal year is less than zero, otherwise 0.
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if a firm receives modified
audit opinion for its A-share financial statement, otherwise 0

RET

The annual market-adjusted stock returns

Rights

Dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm have a rights
issue, otherwise 0

ROA

The ratio of year-end net income to total assets
90

ROE

The ratio of year-end net income to shareholders' equity

Sales Growth

The percentage change in annual sales

SIZE

The nature logarithm of year-end total assets

SOE
STDR
SWITCH

Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm is ultimately
controlled by the government, and 0 otherwise
The standard deviation of residuals from the market model
estimated by weekly return data during the year
Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the firm changes its
auditor in the current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise

TURN

The ratio of year-end sales to total assets

~E

The change in the annual earnings deflated by the firm's
market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year
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Report 3 B-Share Audit Report of AB-share Firm
(stock code: 000017, 2006 audit report)
INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT.

BASIS FOR QUALIFIED OPINION
Scope limitation- Liabilities in respect of corporate guarantees
As disclosed in note 18 to the consolidated financial statements, the Group has ·not provided
contingent liabilities for its subsidiaries, associates and related companies amounting to
RMB25,271,000 as at 31 December 2006. We were not provided with sufficient audit evidence to
determine the completeness of the corporate guarantee entered into by the subsidiaries, associates
and related companies. Therefore, we were unable to satisfy ourselves on the completeness of
contingent liabilities disclosed as at 31 December 2006 nor had obtained adequate information to
assess the completeness of liabilities of the Group in providing the corporate guarantees.
Consequently, we were unable to determine whether the contingent liabilities had been properly
disclosed and provided for in the financial statements.

Disclaimer opinion -liabilities
As disclosed in notes 1 and 28 to the consolidated financial statements, the Group is under
refinance and restructure process and has not yet completed. According to the confirmations
received from the bankers and financial institutes, the Group's accrued interest was
understated in amounting to RMB199,669,982.39. Up to the date of this report, the Group has
not yet agreed the interest elements with the bankers and financial institutes. Adjustment has
not recorded by the Group and we were unable to express our opinion to whether the liabilities
of the Group was correctly recorded as at 31 December 2006.

4. Disclaimer opinion- interest in an associate and accounting treatment
As disclosed in note 10 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company invested 39.83%
in Jiang Xi Li Hua Enterprises Limited ("Li Hua"). According to the share register of Li Hua,
the shareholder of investment in 39.83% should be Hong Kong (Link) Bicycles Limited.
Therefore, we were unable to express our opinion as to whether the Company has equity right
in Li Hua and the recoverability of the net carrying amount of investment in Li Hua in
amounting to RMB26,879,903.07.
We were unable to carry out alternative audit procedures to satisfy ourselves as to the· matters
set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 above.
Any adjustment that might have been found to be necessary in respect of the matters set out
above would have a consequential effect on the financial positions of the Group as at 31
December 2006, the net loss and cash flows of the Group for the year then ended and the
related disclosures in the consolidated financial statements.

QUALIFICATION ARISING FROM MATERIAL UNCERTAINTIES RELATING TO
THE GOING CONCERN BASIS
In forming our opinion, we have considered the adequacy of the disclosure made in note 1(b) to
the consolidated financial statements which describes the liquidity issues and financial
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difficulties experienced by tbe Group and the steps undertaken by the Group to ensure the
Group is able to continue as going concern. As described in note 20 to the consolidated
financial statements that concerning the overdue bank borrowings as at 31 December 2006, the
Group has outstanding borrowings of approximately RMB523,309,000 due to various banks
plus accrued interest which is still under disp11tes. All these amounts were overdue and the
Company is still in the process to re-negotiate the payment terms and dates with the lenders.
The Group's adoption of going concern basis is based on the successful outcome of the debt
restructuring as well as the resulting improvemtent in the financial position of the Group. It is
uncertain at this stage whether and how the <Group can be able to repay the overdue bank
borrowings and other payables.
The consolidated financial statements have been prepared on a going concern basis, the validity
of which depends upon the attainment of profitable and positive cash flow operations, the
restructuring/refinancing of its debts, the continuing financial support of its bankers and the
successful outcome of the steps undertaken :as described in note 1(b) to the consolidated
financial statements to ensure the Group is able to continue as going concern. The consolidated
financial statements do not include any adjustments that would result from a failure to obtain
such financial support. We consider that appropriate disclosures have been made. However, in
view of the extent of the material uncertainties relating to the steps mentioned above that may
cast significant doubt on the Group's ability to •continue as a going concern, we have disclaimed
our opinion. The consolidated financial statements do not include any adjustments that would
be necessary if the various steps as described above fail to obtain. Any adjustment to the
consolidated financial statements may have a c•msequential significant effect on the loss for the
year and net liabilities as at 31 December 2006.

DISCLAIMER OF OPINION
DiSCLAIMER
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

ON

VIEW

GIVEN BY

Because of the significance of the matters describ(:d in the basis for disclaimer of opinion section and
the material uncertainties relating to the going

co~ncern

basis as set out above, we do not express an

opinion on the financial statements as to whether they give a true and fair view of the state of affairs
of the Group as at 31 December 2006 and of the loss and cash flows of the Group for the year then
ended in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards.

For and on behalf of
Wong Lam Leung & Kwok C.P.A. Limited
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